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This paper investigates the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on the net 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows of member countries using a comprehensive 
database of PTAs in a panel setting. We find that PTA membership is associated with a 
positive change in net FDI inflows, and the FDI gains are increasing in the market size of 
the PTA partners and their proximity to the host country. We identify several different 
channels through which preferential trade liberalization may affect FDI, and confirm that 
both threshold effects (signing the agreement) and market size effects (joining a larger 
and faster-growing common market) are important determinants of net FDI inflows, 
although the latter seem to dominate. The estimated relationship is largely driven by 
North-South PTAs, and is most pronounced in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which is a 
period when the majority of “deep integration” PTAs have been advanced. 
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The unprecedented surge in the number of preferential trade agreements signed during the last
decade and a half has reinvigorated the policy and research debate in this area. Medvedev (2006)
has documented that PTAs signed since 1990 account for over three quarters of all PTAs in force;
however, this new wave of PTAs diﬀers from the previous agreements not only in the sheer number,
but, more importantly, in content. One of the distinguishing features of the more recent PTAs,
sometimes referred to as the “third wave of regionalism”(e.g. Adams et al., 2003), is that the
negotiations are no longer dominated by the subject of merchandise trade alone; instead, these
PTAs feature a much more intensive pursuit of other areas of integration, such as investment, trade
in services, setting and harmonization of standards, competition disciplines, customs cooperation,
intellectual property rights (IPR), and dispute settlement.
The emergence of these “deep integration” issues (i.e. areas that go beyond the “shallow inte-
gration” of lowering tariﬀ barriers) as major components of many PTAs suggests that preferential
agreements are increasingly about much more than trade. Medvedev (2006) has shown that less
than half of all trade ﬂows between PTA partners take place in tariﬀ lines where the margin of
tariﬀ preference is high enough to justify the costs of satisfying the relevant rules of origin. At
the global level, between one-sixth and one-tenth of world trade can be meaningfully considered
“preferential”; and the continued progress of multilateral and unilateral liberalization is likely to
further erode preference margins due to the growing incidence of zero and low MFN duty lines.
More and more PTAs are being signed between countries that are far away from each other and
may not be each other’s major trading partners, therefore prompting our choice of terminology as
preferential trade agreements rather than regional trade agreements—a term that has been often
used in the literature discussing preferential liberalization.1 Therefore, among the many reasons
for the continued pursuit of PTAs mentioned in Medvedev (2006), the incentive of greater market
access has become a smaller part of the story. In order to understand the motives behind the
drive toward more PTAs, we need to consider areas of integration other than trade—e.g. the “deep
integration” issues mentioned earlier.
One of the most often mentioned aspects of “deep integration” is foreign direct investment
(FDI). Next to the market access beneﬁts of PTAs, investment provisions are generally aﬀorded
the most attention, recognizing the key role of FDI as a source of ﬁnancing as well as the growth-
enhancing technology spillovers it is hoped to generate. The interest in FDI is also motivated by its
potential ability to create new industries and shift production toward higher value-added activities.
Although larger FDI inﬂows do not automatically translate into beneﬁts for the host economy (for
example, the emergence of a dual or enclave economy is a major concern), the potential gains from
greater access to ﬁnancing, job creation, and possible knowledge and technology spillovers can be
very enticing for policymakers. For example, many observers viewed the expected post-NAFTA
increase in cross-border investment inﬂows as the main motivation of the agreement for Mexico (see
Lederman et al., 2005, chapter 4). A number of other recent PTAs, particularly the North-South
agreements, have heavily emphasized speciﬁc commitments in the area of investment liberalization
and have carried great expectations with regard to increased FDI. Thus, the potential of greater
FDI has become an important motivating factor in the pursuit of PTAs.
Although the trade outcomes of PTAs have received extensive attention in the theoretical
1This choice of terminology saves us from using terms such as “inter-regional regional agreements” to describe
PTAs that span multiple regions. Of course, this does not change the fact that the largest and most well-known PTAs,
as well as those that account for the bulk of preferential trade, are all between contiguous partners (e.g. NAFTA
alone is 37 percent of all trade between PTA partners).
1and empirical literature, the FDI consequences of these agreements have generated less academic
interest. This knowledge gap is particularly striking given the growing importance of FDI in
PTA negotiations. Theoretical models identify both investment-creating and investment-diverting
eﬀects of PTAs and leave the question of which ones dominate to empirical studies. The empirical
literature on FDI and PTAs has traditionally focused on case studies of large and well-known
agreements such as the EU, NAFTA, or MERCOSUR; it is only in the last few years that cross-
country regression estimates of the eﬀects of PTAs on FDI began to appear in the literature.
However, despite sampling a large number of countries, these recent studies continue to focus on a
small subset of all PTAs in force. This paper aims to add to this emerging literature by combining
an extensive sample of PTAs with a set of FDI determinants in a panel framework. Our ﬁrst
contribution is a concise review of the existing theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence on
the relationship between PTAs and FDI. The empirical section of this paper tests for a signiﬁcant
relationship between preferential liberalization and net FDI inﬂows by country in a large panel of
high income and developing nations over the last two decades. We conduct extensive speciﬁcation
analysis in order to arrive at a baseline model that adequately explains the variation in the data and
establishes a positive relationship between preferential liberalization and net FDI. We then check
the robustness of this relationship to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the PTA variable and decompose
the FDI eﬀect by time period, geographic region, and income level of the host country. The rest
of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes the theory of the eﬀects of preferential
liberalization on FDI, while section 3 highlights the previous empirical ﬁndings. Section 4 presents
the model and discusses the estimation results. Section 5 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 The theory of preferential liberalization and FDI
There are a number of ways in which PTAs can aﬀect FDI ﬂows. In this section, we identify
ﬁve major channels through which preferential liberalization can inﬂuence FDI: the direct eﬀects of
investment provisions, the indirect eﬀects of changes in trade ﬂows, improvements in the investment
climate, creation of an extended market, and long-term growth eﬀects. The following discussion
examines each of these mechanisms in some detail; however, the purpose is not to add to the already
vast literature on the determinants of FDI, but rather to draw on the existing studies to delineate
some general links between PTAs and FDI without specifying a formal model.
2.1 PTA investment provisions
The most immediate impact of PTAs on foreign investment is the direct response of FDI to the
implementation of various investment provisions in an agreement. We use the term “investment
provisions” to refer to the removal of regulatory and legal barriers to international capital ﬂows
and the participation of foreign investors in domestic ﬁrms and ﬁnancial markets. If present, the
implementation of these provisions will generally work to bring in more FDI as the agreement
opens up new sectors, relaxes foreign ownership restrictions, and changes or abolishes local content
requirements. However, while the transition mechanism is straightforward, signiﬁcant increases in
FDI ﬂows can materialize only if the most important sectors are not left out of the liberalization
schedules and the relevant provisions are successfully implemented. In addition, investment pro-
visions alone are not a guarantee of increased FDI—higher levels of investment are only possible
with the implementation of complementary policies that serve to improve the overall investment
climate.
2FDI provisions have become more common in recent agreements, which make up the “third
wave” of PTAs that began in the 1990s (see Table 1 for a partial list of PTAs whose texts include
the liberalization of cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows). At the same time, while the incidence of inclusion
of FDI disciplines in PTAs is increasing, most of the active PTAs still do not contain any explicit
investment provisions, and the majority of those that do fail to make speciﬁc commitments, delin-
eate timelines for implementation, and ensure compliance. Notable exceptions include many US
free trade agreements, several EU agreements, and a few South-South PTAs.










US-Jordan Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
US-Chile Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
US-Singapore Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
US-Australia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
US-CAFTA Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
US-Morocco Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
NAFTA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EU-South Africa No No No Yes No Yes Yes
EU-Mexico Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes* Yes Yes
EU-Chile Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes
Euro-Med. No No No Yes* No Yes Yes
Japan-Singapore Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canada-Chile Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
South-South
MERCOSUR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Andean Comm. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
CARICOM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
AFTA Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No
SADC No n.a. n.a. n.a. Yes Yes Yes
COMESA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Chile-Mexico Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: World Bank (2004).
Note: While EU agreements mention cooperation in most of the subject areas, only those in which speciﬁc
commitments are undertaken receive a “Yes” rating. (*) denotes areas where implementation steps are to
be agreed on at a later date. Euro-Med. agreements include bilateral PTAs between the EU and developing
countries in the Mediterranean basin—EU-Algeria, EU-Tunisia, etc.—that serve as predecessors to a uniﬁed
EU-Mediterranean Free Trade Area to be implemented by 2010.
It is important to emphasize that Table 1 is not representative of all the 229 active PTAs, and
relying on it to make any generalizations about the content and relative strength of investment
provisions for all agreements in force is likely to be misleading. There are several reasons why
obtaining information on the investment provisions of many PTAs is a challenging task. First, the
texts of many agreements are not easily available, and therefore it is diﬃcult to estimate how many
PTAs even mention investment as a potential area of cooperation and integration. Second, PTAs
3that do discuss investment often rely on additional schedules to delineate speciﬁc details; diﬀerent
agreements focus on diﬀerent sectors, have varying domestic ownership requirements, and allow
for diverse mechanisms of transferring ownership and resolving investor disputes. For example,
the US-led agreements commonly emphasize the liberalization of telecommunications and ﬁnancial
services, while the EU-led agreements focus on the lock-in of existing reforms and tend to be
more vague on future liberalization commitments.2 Among South-South PTAs, the incidence of
investment provisions is much more rare. However, when present, these provisions tend to be quite
broad and usually rely on the negative list approach.3 Some examples of sectors excluded from
the investment liberalization provisions in South-South PTAs are automobiles (MERCOSUR) and
telecommunications (COMESA).
Despite the wide-ranging diﬀerences in the content of investment provisions of PTAs, we can
identify several features that are common to most agreements. These include the MFN and national
treatment provisions, which ensure that no third party investor is aﬀorded beneﬁts that are not
available to investors from within the preferential area, and that investors from within the PTA
are treated equally without regard to their national origin. Together, the two provisions can
signiﬁcantly boost investor conﬁdence and the transparency of the policy environment, as their
combination implies that investors who are residents of the PTA member countries are entitled to
the best available treatment in any of the PTA countries.
Overall, PTAs that include speciﬁc investment provisions are likely to generate additional FDI
inﬂows for the member countries, although the magnitude of the impact will vary with the relative
strength of the provisions, the sectors they include, and the speed and eﬃciency with which they are
implemented. In addition, complementary policies aimed at strengthening the overall investment
climate are generally regarded as a necessary condition for any boost in incoming FDI. We turn to
examining the eﬀects of these policies in the next section.
2.2 Investment climate
In addition to explicit investment provisions, the “third wave” agreements cover a number of other
subjects that can inﬂuence FDI: trade in services, setting and harmonization of standards, compe-
tition policy, customs cooperation, IPR, and dispute settlement (see Table 1 for some examples of
PTAs that contain these provisions). Although not directly related to merchandise trade or invest-
ment, these features improve the host economy’s investment climate and are thus likely to result
in increased FDI inﬂows. The liberalization of service sectors is a diﬃcult ﬁt in the investment
climate category, although it provides perhaps the most clear-cut link to increased investment. This
is due to the fact that the provision of most services (with the exception of back-oﬃce products
and remote customer service) requires establishing a presence in the source country, which in turn
necessitates new foreign investment.
2It should be noted that there two qualitatively diﬀerent categories of EU-led PTAs: those with the ultimate
goal of joining the EU (accession agreements), and all others. The accession countries are required to gradually
adopt all existing EU rules and regulations with respect to investment ﬂows, and the details of this process are
extensively speciﬁed and carefully monitored. Other EU-led PTAs devote much less attention to “deep integration”
issues, although EU tends to heavily emphasize competition disciplines in both multilateral and PTA forums.
3The negative list approach involves specifying only those sectors that are excluded from liberalization, while all
others are subject to opening. On the other hand, a positive list approach speciﬁes only the sectors to be liberalized,
with all others remaining protected. Although in theory both vehicles can yield a similar degree of reduction in the
level of external protection, in practice PTAs utilizing negative lists tend to result in broader and more aggressive
liberalization.
4Other provisions that tend to encourage foreign investors include clear procedures for dis-
pute settlement and eﬀective protection of one of the key advantages of multinational enterprises
(MNEs)—intellectual property.4 Taken together, these policies are likely to generate an “invest-
ment creation” eﬀect—an FDI parallel to the classic trade creation example. However, although
the theoretical links between these provisions and greater incentives for foreign investment are rel-
atively simple, none of them guarantee increased FDI or, conversely, that FDI will not increase
even if these disciplines are not strengthened following the signing of a PTA. In other words, im-
proved dispute settlement mechanisms and more IPR protection are neither necessary nor suﬃcient
conditions for increased FDI, although both are capable of creating additional investment at the
margin. The empirical literature conﬁrms this observation, since the relationship between, for ex-
ample, IPR provisions and FDI is diﬃcult to establish and, if found, tends to be quite weak. Thus,
in a review of the literature on the relationship between the strength of the IPR regime and FDI,
Maskus (2000) cites Mansﬁeld (1993), Maskus and Eby-Konan (1994), and Primo Braga and Fink
(1998), who could not establish a link between measures of IPR protection and the distribution
of FDI. Other studies, such as Lee and Mansﬁeld (1996) and Maskus (1998), manage to isolate
a relationship between US-sourced FDI and IPR, but the results are tentative and, for the latter
paper, limited to developing countries.
Even if a particular agreement does not go very far in terms of “deep integration,” its provisions
could still inspire investor conﬁdence by locking in the existing reforms. Krueger (1999) mentions
this possibility in an argument for PTAs as “building blocks” toward global free trade. This hy-
pothesis is also supported by Burﬁsher et al. (2001), who, while analyzing the eﬀects of NAFTA
on its member countries, argue that one of the agreement’s main impacts on Mexico has been to
lock in the country’s commitment to reforms and open policy stance, which in turn helped to but-
tress investor conﬁdence during the peso crisis and improve the aggregate trade balance. A related
transmission channel is that PTAs may stimulate FDI to the extent that greater outward orien-
tation contributes to an overall lowering of country political risk (the reform lock-in phenomenon
is just one example of this). In this case, the results of Kolstad and Tondel (2002), who note a
positive association between low political risk and larger FDI per capita in a cross-sectional study
of 120 developing and industrialized countries, may be relevant for the link between preferential
liberalization and FDI.
At the same time, other “third wave” provisions such as mutual recognition of standards and
enforcement of competition rules could result in increased or decreased FDI. To the extent that
these represent non-tariﬀ barriers to trade, the removal of such barriers may encourage MNEs to
export rather than defer production to a local aﬃliate. Alternatively, since the goods produced in
a host country can now be sold in a larger market, the above provisions could motivate increased
investment in foreign subsidiaries. Overall, the observations in this and previous paragraphs show
that the relationship between FDI and PTA investment climate provisions is diﬃcult to predict
ex ante. At the same time, while most of the existing empirical evidence points to a positive
association between the two, the relationship is not robust to changes in speciﬁcation and varied
samples.
4See, for example, chapter 4 of Maskus (2000), which suggests that FDI, particularly when it represents complex
but easily copied technologies, is likely to respond positively to stronger protection of IPRs, since such protection
increases the value of MNEs’ knowledge-based assets.
52.3 FDI and trade
Despite the increased attention devoted to “third wave”/“deep integration” issues in recent PTAs,
reduction of barriers to merchandise trade remains the focal point of any preferential agreement.
Therefore, one of the main PTA-FDI interaction eﬀects is the response of foreign investment to the
PTA-induced changes in trade ﬂows. The key determinant of the sign and magnitude of this eﬀect
is whether, at the margin, FDI and trade are substitutes or complements. Since intra- and extra-
PTA trade is aﬀected diﬀerently by preferential liberalization (the famous issue of trade creation
vs. trade diversion), we can expect the impact on incoming FDI to vary by source country. In line
with standard trade theory, the following discussion will assume that intra-PTA trade increases
following liberalization, and that extra-PTA trade does not.5
The early literature on the interactions between investment and trade, as noted by Blomstr¨ om
and Kokko (1997), conceptualized the two as diﬀerent modes of reaching foreign markets. According
to this view, FDI is attracted to protected markets, where it is cheaper to set up a subsidiary than
pay the tariﬀs required to serve the market through exports (a practice referred to as “tariﬀ-
jumping” FDI). This type of FDI has a long history, going back to the industrialization of Canada
and Australia (Caves, 1996). Chapter 3 of World Bank (2002) cites studies that conﬁrm that
high tariﬀ rates on imported goods induced FDI inﬂows into the United Kingdom (Dunning, 1958),
Canada (Horst, 1972), and Australia (Brash, 1966). By lowering or eliminating tariﬀs between PTA
members, preferential liberalization removes incentives for this type of investment, and we therefore
expect tariﬀ-jumping FDI to respond negatively to increased intra-PTA trade (which takes place as
a result of lower tariﬀ levels—the well-known trade creation result). On the other hand, as long as
some trade diversion takes place following the PTA’s entry into force, the reduction in trade ﬂows
with non-PTA trading partners may be accompanied by increases in investment ﬂows. However,
in line with intuition, empirical evidence suggests that tariﬀ-jumping FDI is “transient, lasting as
long as the artiﬁcial policy-induced incentives” (Balasubramanyam, 2001).
More recently, studies have proposed that FDI need not be undertaken simply to circumvent
trade barriers. Instead, the literature has focused on the role of intangible assets of MNEs as a
major motivation for FDI (see, for example, Caves (1996) for review). Dunning (1977) provides a
conceptual framework where a MNE’s decision to undertake foreign investment is guided by one
or more of the following motivations: ownership advantage, where a ﬁrm’s ownership of a product
or production process gives it market power in a foreign country, location advantage, where a ﬁrm
enjoys beneﬁts from relocating production abroad that exceed its plant-level economies of scale
at home, or internalization advantage, where a ﬁrm gains more by internalizing production rather
than licensing it to a foreign associate. Embedding these ideas in a general equilibrium model with
endogenous MNEs, Markusen (2002) argues that “trade and investment are complements when the
countries diﬀer in relative endowments and investment is vertical, while trade and investment are
substitutes when the countries are similar and investment is horizontal.” Contrary to conclusions
of the earlier paragraph, this framework suggests that the relationship between preferential trade
liberalization and FDI can be positive or negative, regardless of whether trade ﬂows are intra- or
extra-PTA.
Globerman (2002) develops an argument that FDI is likely to respond positively to preferential
5We assume that at least some trade creation takes place within a PTA: that is, no matter how little, some reduction
in overall protection takes place between PTA partners. With regard to extra-PTA trade, there is no reason to expect
increased trade between PTA partners and other countries as a result of the agreement—therefore we assume that
the change in extra-PTA trade is non-positive. We make no assumptions about the relative magnitudes of the two
eﬀects—i.e. whether a PTA is net trade creating or diverting.
6trade liberalization regardless of whether the MNE production structure is vertical or horizontal.
This view is grounded in the growing importance of intra-industry and intra-ﬁrm trade, as opposed
to inter-industry trade based on diﬀerential endowments (see, for example, Chapter 2 of World
Bank, 2002). Regardless of whether an MNE is vertical (taking advantage of production process
economies of scale) or horizontal (beneﬁting from product economies of scale), the reduction of
trade barriers between PTA members makes it less costly for aﬃliates to ship intermediate and
ﬁnal products to each other. Thus, since MNEs’ production structure is highly integrated, intra-
PTA FDI is likely to respond positively to preferential trade liberalization. At the same time,
as long as external protection does not increase, extra-PTA FDI should not decline. This view
has received some support from the recent empirical literature, which points to the importance of
openness in attracting FDI and the decline of tariﬀ jumping as a primary motivation for FDI ﬂows.6
In reviewing cross-country regressions on the determinants of FDI, Chakrabarti (2001) argues that
after market size, openness to trade has been the most reliable indicator of the attractiveness of a
location for FDI (see also Kolstad and Tondel (2002) for a recent literature review). Thus, there
are reasons to believe that FDI and trade may be complements.
Clearly, the existing theoretical and empirical evidence does not provide an unambiguous answer
to the direction of the relationship between trade and FDI. Furthermore, the above discussion is
limited by the simplifying assumption that there are no constraints on a MNE’s ability to generate
FDI. Blomstr¨ om and Kokko (1997) point out that “a ﬁrm’s capacity to undertake new FDI projects
[may be] restricted by its administrative capability or the availability of investment capital.” This
implies that, in addition to the possibility that intra- and extra-PTA FDI can be substitutes (an
investment parallel to the standard trade creation/diversion argument), it could also be the case
that within a PTA, investment will be attracted to some markets at the expense of others (includ-
ing the home/source country market). In particular, a more liberal intra-PTA environment may
encourage a MNE to reorganize its production structure by concentrating investment in aﬃliates
with the greatest location advantages—leading to greater FDI inﬂows in some PTA partners but
also to outﬂows from others. Thus, the net change in FDI ﬂows as a result of preferential trade
liberalization could be either positive or negative, depending on the type of FDI, individual country
characteristics, and MNEs’ capacity to undertake new investment projects.
2.4 FDI and market size
While the above discussion illustrates that the aggregate relationship between trade and FDI re-
mains unclear, the connection between host market size and FDI is well established. In a review of
literature, Lim (2001) cites both survey and econometric evidence that conﬁrms market size as the
most robust determinant of FDI. In fact, virtually all studies of FDI ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect of the size of the host market on FDI inﬂows (see also Kolstad and Tondel, 2002; Chakrabarti,
2001). To the extent that a PTA creates an extended market through closer integration of PTA
partners, this channel suggests a positive relationship between PTAs and FDI. Blomstr¨ om and
Kokko (1997) argue that this eﬀect works through increased ﬁrm size—a larger market may allow
some ﬁrms to grow beyond what they would have been able to achieve in segmented national mar-
kets, or the competitive pressures of a larger marketplace may force some ﬁrms to expand through
mergers and acquisitions of former competitors. In either case, larger ﬁrms are likely to have
greater R&D expenditures, leading to creation of new intangible assets that motivate more FDI.
6This transition away from tariﬀ-jumping FDI could be attributed to the steady decline of average tariﬀ rates
over the past two decades, since FDI of this type is less likely to be found in more open economies.
7Furthermore, larger ﬁrms may simply have more capacity to participate in new FDI projects due
to scale economies. Since the market size of countries not party to a PTA remains unchanged, the
extended market FDI eﬀect is ﬁrst and foremost an intra-PTA phenomenon; however, additional
extra-PTA FDI could also be generated if MNEs’ capacity to undertake FDI increases. Thus, in
contrast to the previous sub-section, the positive relationship between preferential liberalization
and FDI could hold not only for host, but also for source countries.
One issue with the extended common market hypothesis of the relationship between PTAs
and FDI is that its validity relies on a certain geographic and economic proximity between PTA
members. This paper has argued that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the “third wave”
of PTAs is that more agreements are being signed between distant countries who are not each
other’s major trading partners. In this case, it is diﬃcult to build a theoretical argument for
the ﬁrms’ need to expand in order to serve geographically, economically, and culturally distant
markets. For instance, even after the full implementation of the US-Morocco and US-Jordan free
trade agreements, it would not be appropriate to view the partners’ economies as an extended
common market, at least not in the same sense as NAFTA or MERCOSUR. On the other hand, to
the extent that there is a certain level of demand for Middle Eastern products in the US, we would
expect to see a concentration of production of these goods in the FTA beneﬁciaries following the
phase-in of preferences.7 In other words, production would be reallocated to Morocco and Jordan
from neighboring countries without preferential access to the US, and the former would receive
additional FDI.
The above discussion shows that the PTA extended common market eﬀect on FDI is not auto-
matic, and its magnitude depends on the economic and geographic proximity of the partners. Al-
though preferential liberalization can potentially bring some FDI beneﬁts even for distant countries,
the impact is likely to be much stronger for closer-positioned partners with established economic
ties. Therefore, while the sign of this eﬀect is almost certainly positive, its relative size is likely to
vary considerably across diﬀerent PTAs.
2.5 FDI and growth
The links between PTAs and FDI discussed in the previous sub-sections are all likely to be of
short- or medium-term nature (the time frame during which relevant provisions are implemented
and trade ﬂows adjust). However, PTAs may also aﬀect FDI through more dynamic means by
generating additional economic growth. The complementarities between FDI and growth have been
well documented in the empirical literature. A number of studies, including World Bank (2001) and
UNCTAD (1998) have shown that, controlling for other factors, FDI ﬂows are positively associated
with economic growth. Unfortunately, the direction of causation is not clear: while a large literature
documents the growth-enhancing knowledge and eﬃciency spillovers from FDI (see, for example, the
review in Lim, 2001), other studies, most notably Rodrik (1999), have suggested that FDI tends
to be located in more productive and faster-growing economies.8 One solution to the question
7This assumes that the preferences granted to Moroccan and Jordanian exporters represent a signiﬁcant cost
advantage vs. exporting the same goods under the MFN regime. For many products, this may not be the case—see
the discussion in Medvedev (2006), which noted that more than half of all trade between PTA partners takes place in
goods with very low or zero MFN tariﬀs; furthermore, more than 35 percent of all US tariﬀ lines carry a zero percent
MFN duty.
8This line of reasoning is similar to the critique of trade and growth literature by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001),
who suggest that most of the trade policy variables used in previous studies are endogenous and serve mainly as
proxies for macroeconomic stability. They argue that more successful and faster growing economies tend to trade
more and have a better trade policy environment, while exogenous changes in trade policy are not a signiﬁcant
8of causality may be the “virtuous circle” hypothesis, where new investment generates additional
growth, which in turn brings in more investment through both supply and demand mechanisms
(i.e. a faster-growing economy demands a larger quantity of investment, including foreign, while
foreign investors are more likely to channel funds toward countries with higher growth rates and
consequently greater expected proﬁts).9 However, regardless of the direction of the relationship,
there is considerable support in both theoretical and empirical literature for the positive association
between FDI and growth.
While the positive FDI-growth link is well established, the connection between PTAs and growth
is much more ambiguous. There are several channels through which preferential trade liberalization
may increase economic growth, although the validity of each pathway must be heavily qualiﬁed.
For example, if a PTA is trade-creating and improves the overall trade policy environment, we
may expect the positive trade liberalization-growth link to be applicable. However, there are
important caveats to this channel: ﬁrst, PTAs do not necessarily result in a more liberal trade
environment,10 and second, the ability of trade liberalization to contribute to improved growth
performance has been subject to much criticism since the early studies by Sachs and Warner
(1995) and Dollar (1992) proposing this hypothesis. The main problem, as argued most notably
by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001), is that the direction of causation is not clear and the data only
support the conclusion that richer countries tend to have lower trade barriers. The more recent
literature on the relationship between trade and growth has focused on the role of institutions in
determining both overall trade openness and the economy’s growth potential. For example, Rodrik
et al. (2004) show that institutional quality is the main determinant of growth in incomes, and that
the eﬀect of trade on growth is insigniﬁcant once institutional controls are added to the regression
equation. Furthermore, while trade does not seem to aﬀect institutions, the converse relationship
is positive, large, and statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand, Frankel and Rose (2002) ﬁnd
that the trade-growth hypothesis remains valid in the presence of institutional and geographic
variables. Dollar and Kraay (2003) show that, despite the very high correlation between trade and
institutions, trade explains a larger share of growth in the short and medium run. To complicate
matters further, the deﬁnition of openness appears to matter for conclusions: Yanikkaya (2003)
ﬁnds a positive association between trade volumes and growth, but also a positive relationship
between trade barriers (e.g. average tariﬀs) and growth in incomes. Therefore, the trade-growth
hypothesis is far from certain, although in a review of the literature, Winters (2004) concludes
that “[d]espite the econometric diﬃculties of establishing beyond doubt from cross-sections that
openness enhances growth, the weight of the evidence is quite clearly in that direction.”
Another potential PTA-growth link may work through increased eﬃciency and productivity
gains brought about by the higher degree of economic integration in a PTA. However, productivity
and eﬃciency gains are notoriously diﬃcult to measure, and attributing them mainly to PTA-
related integration requires a certain leap of faith. Therefore, the validity of the PTA-growth-FDI
hypothesis is uncertain. Berthelon (2004) provides some evidence in favor of this relationship: using
a panel of both high income and developing countries between 1960 and 1999, he ﬁnds a positive
correlation between regional integration and growth, but the relationship is signiﬁcant only for the
larger countries in the sample.
determinant of economic growth.
9The unfortunate converse to this hypothesis is a downward spiral, where a slow-growing economy is unable to
attract new FDI or possibly even retain the existing projects, and its growth rate suﬀers further.
10For a recent example, consider the EAC agreement between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. It has been a well-
publicized fact that, following the implementation of the customs union and common external tariﬀ, Uganda’s average
level of protection would increase relative to the pre-EAC levels.
9Another possibility bypasses the PTA-growth link and considers instead the additional FDI
generated through one of the channels discussed in the earlier sub-sections. As long as preferential
liberalization results in a net increase in FDI inﬂows, we can rely on the FDI-growth linkages
discussed earlier to generate additional growth and potentially give rise to the “virtuous circle”
hypothesis. This possibility comes with many qualiﬁcations, since the suggested relationship is
complicated and in any case requires an initial positive change in FDI to jump-start the dynamic
PTA-FDI link. The direction of causality is also unclear, since larger and faster-growing economies
may be better positioned to take advantage of regional integration and preferential liberalization
may thus be an eﬀect rather than a cause. At best, the “virtuous circle” may have many entry
points. These could include PTAs, but other factors (e.g. institutions and geography) are likely
to be more important. Therefore, although we may expect to see a positive long-run association
between preferential trade liberalization and FDI through higher rates of economic growth, the
relationship requires a number of rather restrictive initial conditions and is thus tentative at best.
2.6 Summary
The above discussion shows that the possible interactions between PTAs and FDI are multifaceted
and can act in opposite directions (see Table 2). In fact, even the signs of some individual eﬀects
are far from certain. To the extent that multiple transmission channels are present, theory does
not establish their relative magnitudes and therefore provides no ready answer for the direction
of the net eﬀect. In addition, if there are budget constraints on an MNE’s ability to undertake
additional FDI, preferential liberalization may result in reallocation of investment from some PTA
members to others. Even if no such constraints are present, certain countries within PTAs are
likely to beneﬁt more than others because of stronger locational or other advantages. Due to these
ambiguities, the sign and magnitude of the overall PTA-induced change in FDI inﬂows becomes a
question for empirical analysis.
Table 2: Potential eﬀects of preferential trade liberalization on FDI
Transmission channel Expected change in FDI
PTA investment provisions Positive
Other “deep integration” provisions Mostly positive
Trade-FDI elasticity Ambiguous
Market size (both host and source) Positive
Dynamic/growth eﬀects Positive, but highly uncertain
3 Empirical evidence on the eﬀects of PTAs on FDI
Most empirical work dealing with the relationship between PTAs and FDI has until recently been
limited to case studies of large, well-known agreements such as the EU, NAFTA, or MERCOSUR.
Therefore, much of the evidence is largely descriptive. For example, Lim (2001) collects data on
FDI as a percentage of GDP for Portugal, Spain, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, and notes that the
post-PTA FDI share is more than double the pre-PTA share for all countries but Argentina, where
the increase is 70 percent.11 Lederman et al. (2005) show similar results for Spain and Portugal,
11Pre- and post-PTA time periods are deﬁned as 1981-1985 and 1986-1990 for EU accession, 1989-1993 and 1994-
1998 for NAFTA, and 1990-1994 and 1995-1998 for MERCOSUR.
10but note that FDI inﬂows for Greece (as a percentage of GDP) remained relatively unchanged
following its accession to the EU in 1981—a phenomenon attributed mainly to its distorted policy
environment at the time. Furthermore, the authors argue that the additional FDI in Spain and
Portugal represented a one-time portfolio adjustment by investors in favor of these countries, and
that the share of FDI to GDP returned to its pre-accession levels in the longer term. World Bank
(2000) documents an interesting experience for countries outside the EU: FDI declined in EFTA
members following the phase-in of the EU Internal Market Program (IMP) and did not recover
until the establishment of the EEA.12
Other studies present results based on more formal models. For instance, Pain (1997) uses data
on the stock of British FDI in seven sectors in the EU and the US over the 1981-1992 time period to
isolate a sharp increase in intra-EU FDI following the implementation of the IMP in 1986. Pain and
Lansbury (1997) present similar evidence for German investment into the rest of the EU. On the
other hand, Dunning (2000) argues that while the IMP resulted in a substantial net FDI increase in
Europe, the majority of that increase came from countries outside the EU. Furthermore, the direct
impact of the IMP on FDI is small compared to the response of investment to greater market size
and higher income levels generated by European integration.
The evidence on FDI ﬂows into Canada and the US as a result of the Canada-USA FTA
(CUFTA) and NAFTA largely parallels the EU ﬁndings. For the former agreement, Blomstr¨ om
and Kokko (1997) show that while intra-PTA FDI into Canada declined, extra-PTA FDI increased
just enough to oﬀset the decrease. In the US, net FDI rose as a result of CUFTA, but this was
achieved through a large increase in FDI from outside the PTA, which more than made up for
the decreased investment from Canada. Globerman (2002) echoes these ﬁndings by showing that
following CUFTA, and, subsequently, NAFTA, FDI ﬂows to Canada from Europe increased much
more than those from the US. Thus, there is some support for the tariﬀ-jumping hypothesis: since
the consecutive PTAs provided Canada with secure market access to the US, they encouraged
new FDI inﬂows from outside the PTA. At the same time, Canada’s outgoing FDI to Europe grew
faster than its FDI to the US. Globerman (2002) interprets this ﬁnding as indicative of the fact that
increased trade intensity is not necessarily coincident with increased FDI intensity,” which could
be due the existing infrastructure allowing for increased intra-industry CUFTA trade without any
signiﬁcant demand for new FDI. On the other hand, Buckley et al. (2000) ﬁnd that US FDI into
Canada was encouraged by CUFTA and NAFTA; however, exchange rate changes over the same
period also supported new FDI.
Turning to PTAs involving developing countries, Lederman et al. (2005) note that FDI into
Mexico increased in the ﬁrst two years following the agreement, but leveled oﬀ soon afterwards.
In this sense, the pattern of North-South FDI under NAFTA is similar to the stock adjustment
experienced by the new EU entrants. Lederman et al. (2005) also show that this increase in FDI
to Mexico was dominated by North American sources, while inﬂows from other regions rose to a
more limited extent. The former is consistent with Monge-Naranjo (2002), who ﬁnds a positive
eﬀect of NAFTA on US-sourced FDI in Mexico only during the ﬁrst two-three years of the agree-
ment. In addition, Lederman et al. (2005) provide evidence that NAFTA resulted in diversion of
FDI from other countries in Latin America, as Mexico’s share of US-sourced investment remained
stable throughout the 1990s while the share of other countries declined. Blomstr¨ om and Kokko
(1997) and Burﬁsher et al. (2001) argue that one of the main contributions of NAFTA was an
improvement in Mexico’s investment climate, achieved largely through its lock-in of policy reforms.
12EEA is a free trade agreement between the EU and three of the EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway).
See Appendix E of Medvedev (2006) for more details.
11This argument is consistent with the ﬁngings of Graham and Wada (2000), who show that US
FDI to Mexico began to grow rapidly in the late 1980s, much earlier than the implementation of
NAFTA, and attribute the increase to Mexico’s unilateral policy reforms. In the case of MER-
COSUR, Blomstr¨ om and Kokko (1997) show that extra-PTA FDI responded more strongly to the
macroeconomic stabilization programs than the early stages of the Southern Cone project. How-
ever, subsequent deeper integration with the establishment of the customs union seemed to result
in signiﬁcant increases in the US investment position in the region. Chudnovsky and L´ opez (2001)
conﬁrm this result by ﬁnding that most of new FDI in MERCOSUR came from outside the PTA. In
addition, the beneﬁts of greater FDI were not shared equally across PTA members: due to stronger
location advantages, Argentina and Brazil seemed to reap the bulk of the gains.
The evidence on the above agreements seems to suggest that most of the new FDI received
by members of these PTAs is tariﬀ-jumping and/or attracted to larger markets. However, these
features cannot be characteristic of all PTAs in existence, since the large number of agreements
in force would preclude the incentive for such behavior. For instance, the growing number of
overlapping PTAs (documented in Medvedev (2006)) is likely to lower the marginal eﬀect of new
agreements on FDI through the extended common market channel. Consider the example of the
East African Community (EAC) of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, where all three countries are
also members of the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) agreement with several other African nations.
Clearly, the extended common market FDI beneﬁts that Kenya may experience from integrating
with its EAC partners are not going to be seen again when it joins the CBI (although it may
realize additional FDI gains from gaining new access to non-EAC member countries). At the
same time, section 2.3 has noted that average MFN tariﬀs have declined signiﬁcantly over the past
two decades,13 which is likely to signiﬁcantly reduce incentives for tariﬀ-jumping FDI. Finally, the
preceding discussion shows that the size of net FDI inﬂows varies signiﬁcantly by the host country,14
and it is often diﬃcult to separate the PTA eﬀects from the consequences of unilateral liberalization
or stabilization policies. Thus, in order to assess the nature of the relationship between preferential
liberalization and FDI, cross-country panel estimates covering large numbers of PTAs are needed
to complement the case studies of individual agreements.
It is only in the course of the last few years that cross-country analyses of the interactions
between PTAs and FDI began to appear. Some of these studies have concentrated on bilateral
investment, using a methodology similar to the gravity model of international trade, while others
have chosen to focus on the net FDI position of sample countries. As an example of the former,
Levy Yeyati et al. (2003) use 1982-1999 data on bilateral outward FDI stocks for 20 source and 60
host countries and ﬁnd a positive relationship between FDI and membership in the same PTA. They
estimate that, on average, joining a PTA increases bilateral FDI between members by 27 percent
while a larger common market15 aﬀects host’s FDI with an elasticity of just over 0.1. However, their
data does not cover FDI between developing countries and their PTA sample is limited to thirteen
agreements, including the EU. In addition, although the authors do not impose the same functional
relationship for North-South and North-North FDI, their model does not explicitly distinguish
between the two by sweeping any potential diﬀerences into a country-pair speciﬁc intercept term.
Finally, although the model in Levy Yeyati et al. (2003) is useful in determining that regional
integration matters for bilateral FDI, its speciﬁcation does not yield any predictions about the
direction of the net eﬀect on a country’s FDI position.
13More detailed evidence of this has been presented in Medvedev (2006).
14This variation could be related to the economic and geographic proximity of the partners.
15This variable is equal to the total GDP of all PTA members.
12The last diﬃculty is addressed in a study of bilateral FDI by Adams et al. (2003), who improve
on the simple gravity speciﬁcation by including three separate PTA variables16 to account for
intra-PTA FDI creation and extra-PTA FDI diversion, both from PTA members to outsiders and
from non-member countries to PTA partners. The authors consider stocks of outward FDI for
a panel of high-income and developing countries over 1988-1997 and ﬁnd six of the nine sample
PTAs (including the EU) to be investment-creating, one investment-diverting, and two to have no
observable impact. Furthermore, Adams et al. (2003) argue that while tariﬀ-jumping and large
market-seeking incentives for FDI appear to matter for some agreements, the majority of the
investment impact comes from non-trade provisions.
Although studies like Adams et al. (2003) are useful in determining the net FDI eﬀect of
a particular PTA, they cannot establish the impact of preferential liberalization on a net FDI
position of a particular country. This question is addressed by Lederman et al. (2005), who focus
on aggregate FDI ﬂows to 45 countries over the 1980-2000 period and ﬁnd a positive relationship
between PTAs and FDI. Their sample includes seven PTAs, four of which are in Latin America,
and the model assumes that FDI eﬀects are the same across North-North, North-South, and South-
South PTAs. Although the coeﬃcient on the PTA membership dummy is insigniﬁcant, both the
expectation of joining a PTA17 and the size of common market created remain signiﬁcant across
various speciﬁcations. The variable coeﬃcients suggest that the expectation of joining a PTA can
increase FDI ﬂows by more than one-third, while joining a common market twice as large as the
host country can raise FDI ﬂows by twenty percent or more. In another study, Jaumotte (2004)
uses a larger sample of 71 developing countries over 1980-1999. Sub-dividing the sample into ﬁve-
year periods, she ﬁnds a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of the beginning-of-period extended market size
on end-of-period FDI stocks. She considers ﬁfteen PTAs—those that had been established prior
to 1995—but her model disregards much of time-series variation in the data by using only four
observation points over the above period.
In addition to the criticisms mentioned above, the main shortcoming of the existing studies lies
in their small sample size, both in terms of country coverage and the number of PTAs considered.
The latter is a particular handicap, since the coeﬃcient on the extended market variable will be
signiﬁcantly biased if only some PTAs of which a particular country is a member are included. For
example, if the sample PTAs are mainly agreements known to generate large FDI ﬂows, the results
could easily be aﬀected in an upward direction. Another diﬃculty is the lack of diﬀerentiation
between the eﬀects of North-North vs. North-South vs. South-South agreements, since the deter-
minants of FDI are likely to diﬀer across these types of PTAs. Many of the existing studies are also
subject to criticism on econometric grounds, since they do not carefully investigate the time-series
properties of FDI ﬂows, which tend to be heavily autocorrelated. Finally, all large panel estimates
share the same limitation—by imposing homogeneity restrictions on model coeﬃcients, they dis-
regard much of the cross-country and across-time variation that enrich the analysis of individual
PTAs. Therefore, panel results should be viewed as a complement to careful country-level studies
rather than a substitute.
16This follows Soloaga and Winters (2001), who pioneered the three dummy variable speciﬁcation in a gravity
model of trade.
17This variable is equal to 1 for two years prior to the PTA coming into existence and 0 otherwise.
134 Model setup and estimation results
In this section, we investigate the empirical relationship between preferential trade liberalization and
net FDI inﬂows using a panel of 143 countries over the 1980–2003 period. Given the weaknesses
in earlier studies (identiﬁed in section 3), this essay distinguishes itself from previous eﬀorts by
considering the broadest sample of PTAs available, rather than a handful of the most well-known
agreements. In addition, we employ estimation methods that remain consistent in the presence
of panel-level heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. However, due to data limitations, we do not
consider the diﬀerential impacts of various types of agreements, leaving this as an area for future
research. The main contribution of this study lies in determining the links between preferential
liberalization and FDI for the largest possible sample of countries and PTAs.
The choice of net FDI inﬂows as the dependent variable18 imposes several important limitations
on the direction of our analysis and we acknowledge these at the outset. First, this precludes the use
of bilateral datasets, and therefore does not allow us to distinguish FDI by source. This implies,
for example, that we cannot separate intra-PTA FDI from investment that comes from outside
the preferential trade area, and we cannot readily diﬀerentiate between FDI from high income and
developing countries. Second, our choice of the dependent variable as a net value carries an implicit
acknowledgment that we cannot distinguish whether, for example, a positive change in net FDI
inﬂows is driven by increased inﬂows or reduced outﬂows. This implies a certain diﬃculty in the
comparison and interpretation of the results, since a similar change in the dependent variable may
be driven by inﬂows in some countries, outﬂows in others, and yet other countries may experience
varying combinations of the two eﬀects. This is particularly important for the PTA-growth-FDI
link proposed in section 2.5, since the technology content of new investment inﬂows may be diﬀerent
from the composition of the existing stock.
Despite these diﬃculties, our choice of the dependent variable has some important advantages.
Unlike several studies mentioned in section 3, we consider FDI ﬂows rather than stocks in order
to improve our tracking of the variation in the data. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) point out
that “to the extent that inward and outward FDI have been going on for a long time, recent and
relatively large changes in FDI behavior may not be apparent if FDI stock ﬁgures are used.” That
is, as long as FDI stocks are relatively large, annual innovations to these stocks are likely to be
marginal, causing an empirical model to have diﬃculty identifying the determinants of change in
the dependent variable. In addition, the calculation of FDI stocks is often not homogeneous across
countries (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). Regarding the issue of bilateral FDI ﬂows vs. net ﬂows
by country, the bilateral data are quite scarce and are usually limited to high income countries as
the source of foreign investment. Focusing on total net FDI inﬂows of each country allows us to
signiﬁcantly increase the sample size and also to include South-South FDI ﬂows, albeit implicitly.
Furthermore, the exact origin of FDI may not be as important as the type of investment, which
is not country-speciﬁc. For example, it is not clear that US- and EU-sourced FDI is qualitatively
18The full series name is “foreign direct investment, net inﬂows” (see Appendix A for more details). This corresponds
to the increase in holdings of foreign enterprises inside a country less the decreases in domestic asset holdings by the
same enterprises. It is important to distinguish our dependent variable from net FDI, which is the diﬀerence between
net FDI inﬂows and net FDI outﬂows (the net increase in home country MNE assets abroad). Using the net inﬂows
deﬁnition would imply, for example, that FDI would increase in both the US and Canada if the two countries began
investing more into each other after the implementation of CUFTA. Contrast this with the net FDI deﬁnition, which
under the same circumstances could show little or no change in the FDI position of either country (if the bilateral
ﬂows would be of the same magnitude and thus cancel out). It is our belief that the former deﬁnition represents a
more intuitive way of capturing cross-country changes in FDI ﬂows, and also reﬂects the policy goals of most countries
in seeking PTAs as a way to attract net FDI inﬂows.
14diﬀerent if both are of the same type (e.g. vertical FDI) and destined for the same country and
sector. Therefore, looking at aggregate (rather than bilateral) FDI may not be a large cost in terms
of the richness of the data while allowing us the signiﬁcant beneﬁt of considering a much broader
sample of countries.19 Finally, while our lack of ability to identify the source countries behind
changes in net FDI inﬂows may represent an analytical shortcoming, the policy relevance of this
may not be as critical. This is because policymakers are much more likely to care about the overall
change in the country’s investment position rather than changes in the FDI decisions of individual
investment partners. For example, Mexico’s decision to join NAFTA was likely motivated by the
desire to attract increased FDI not only from the US but from other sources (Europe, Asia) as
well. In addition, although deﬁnite proof has yet to be supplied, Globerman and Shapiro (1999)
argue that FDI inﬂows and outﬂows are symmetrical. Therefore, the choice of net FDI inﬂows as
the dependent variable appears to be defensible due to both data and policy considerations.
Our analysis of the relationship between preferential trade liberalization and net FDI inﬂows
focuses on three broad sets of questions. The ﬁrst question is whether the positive relationship
between PTAs and FDI described in the earlier literature holds in our sample. Here, we will
rely on a similar methodology as in the previous studies since the objective is to determine if the
same PTA-FDI transmission channels can be identiﬁed in our dataset.20 The second question is
whether we can identify alternative (better) ways to measure the association between preferential
trade liberalization and FDI. In particular, we will consider several speciﬁcations of the extended
common market variable to determine which one yields better estimation results. Furthermore,
we will investigate whether the number of PTAs signed or the expectation of joining a PTA can
oﬀer additional insights into the PTA-FDI relationship. The third and ﬁnal set of questions will be
answered by decomposition analysis: can we extract additional information from decomposing the
sample into sub-groups by time period, geographic region, and income level? In particular, we will
attempt to identify important trends in the sub-samples that may be driving the overall results.
4.1 Replication of previous studies
The starting point for our empirical analysis is the model of Lederman et al. (2005). The main
reason for choosing this model is the fact that it is the only existing study that models net FDI
inﬂows by country, which oﬀers two important advantages. First, the set of independent variables
in Lederman et al. (2005) is a good initial point for determining the speciﬁcation of our model (i.e.
at least some of the more robust determinants of FDI in their study are likely to be signiﬁcant in our
sample as well). Second, since the main objective of this section is to attempt to identify a similar
PTA-FDI relationship as earlier studies, the work of Lederman et al. (2005) is an appropriate point
of reference given their choice of the dependent variable. The following discussion will present the
model used in the study by Lederman et al. (2005), apply it to our data, oﬀer some critiques of
the model speciﬁcation and econometric methods, and introduce an alternative approach that will
become the baseline speciﬁcation of this paper.
The vector of independent variables in Lederman et al. (2005) can be broadly separated into
four main categories:
19Note that our inability to distinguish intra-PTA FDI from extra-PTA FDI remains a major disadvantage in this
case.
20In this step, we will generally follow the Lederman et al. (2005) study, since it is the only paper in the existing
literature that considers net FDI inﬂows as the dependent variable. We will, however, make several modiﬁcations to
their model—see section 4.2 for more details.
151. PTA eﬀects, including a PTA membership dummy, an expected PTA dummy, a measure of
the size of the extended common market, and an investment diversion variable;21
2. Global eﬀects, including world GDP growth, world FDI, and global interest rates (proxied by
the return on a one-year US treasury bill);
3. Local eﬀects, including the level of GDP and its growth rate, outward orientation of the
economy, per capita income relative to the US, inﬂation, and current account balance;
4. Institutional eﬀects, including indices of government stability, rule of law, and quality of
bureaucracy.
In attempting to replicate the results of the Lederman et al. (2005) study, we will consider only
a subset of the explanatory variables above in order to maximize eﬃciency and data coverage. The
data for all series have been collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of
the World Bank. Our criteria for variable choice include ease of data collection, sound theoretical
justiﬁcations, and the variable’s robustness in the estimates presented by the authors. For example,
among the variables listed under item 1, we will only consider the extended common market vari-
able and the expected PTA dummy. We will not use the investment diversion variable due to the
diﬃculties involved in its construction and the fact that its coeﬃcient was never signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero in any of the speciﬁcations presented by Lederman et al. (2005). Similarly, we will
not use the PTA dummy to capture the potential FDI gains from preferential liberalization. This is
because the dummy oﬀers no additional information in the presence of an extended market variable
(which, like a dummy, carries a value of zero for countries that are not members of any PTAs, and
a positive value for PTA members) and may lead to a violation of the full rank assumption. In fact,
Lederman et al. (2005) include the PTA dummy in only half of their speciﬁcations and always ﬁnd
the variable insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, conﬁrming our suspicions. We therefore choose to
drop the insigniﬁcant variable (PTA dummy), a decision that is also more defensible on theoretical
grounds. This is because the PTA common market variable, despite its potential problems, is likely
to explain more of the variation in net FDI inﬂows than a simple dummy since the former allows
the model to diﬀerentiate across PTAs by the cumulative size of their country members.22 We are
thus left with an expected PTA dummy and the extended common market size as variables that
will be used to capture the potential link(s) between preferential liberalization and FDI.
In order to construct both of the above variables, data on PTA membership by country have
been obtained from the PTA database of Medvedev (2006), which provides comprehensive coverage
of PTAs in force.23 Overall, our panel takes into account 196 preferential agreements (both regional
and bilateral), many of which overlap and which encompass the vast majority of sample countries.
For countries that are members of at least one PTA, the PTAGDP variable is deﬁned so that it is
equal to zero for all years prior to the PTA entering into force, and the log of the combined GDP
21Lederman et al. (2005) describe the investment diversion variable as a “weighted sum of the GDP of all the
sample countries participating in FTAs, with the weight of each countrys GDP given by the fraction of worldwide
GDP covered by its FTA arrangements.”
22Recall that the simple version of this variable does not take into account the geographic and economic distance
between PTA partners. We will consider these issues in more detail during speciﬁcation tests in section 4.3, where,
for example, we will investigate the eﬀects of using the dummy variable alone, as well as the appropriateness of
alternative versions of the PTA extended common market variable.
23This dataset improves upon previous sources by including agreements that have not been notiﬁed to the WTO
as well as PTAs found in the WTO database. This addition is important since the PTAs that have not been notiﬁed
to the WTO account for more than 45% of the total number of PTAs in force.
16of PTA partners thereafter. If a country is a member of multiple PTAs, we sum over the GDP of




∀i 6= j, where j ranges over all of
the PTA partners of country i; in a time-series context, we add the GDP of new PTA partners to
the PTAGDP value in the year in which a country enters into a new agreement. In the case of
overlapping agreements (i.e. when the same country pair appears in more than one PTA)24 we add
a given partner’s GDP to the PTAGDP variable in the year in which the earlier of the two (or
more) agreements enters into force. Finally, for countries that are not members of a single PTA in
a given year, PTAGDP is equal to zero. It is important to acknowledge in advance that this is
only one of a number of potential measures of the size of the PTA extended common market, and
we construct the PTAGDP variable in the above fashion mainly to be consistent with the model
of Lederman et al. (2005). Both this section and section 2.4 have mentioned several shortcomings
of this speciﬁcation, and we will consider alternative measures later in the paper.
Among the global eﬀects in the model of Lederman et al. (2005), we retain the global FDI and
global growth variables but drop the international interest rate variable. This decision is driven
by two reasons. First, it is not clear that the one-year return on the US Treasury bills is a good
measure of the global interest rate environment. Second, the coeﬃcient on this variable is never
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in any of the speciﬁcations attempted by the authors. Both the
global FDI and the global growth variables are calculated using the “world” aggregate of the WDI
rather than the sum (or average) of the relevant values for each of the sample countries; this is
done because the “world” aggregate is already adjusted for missing observations. Note that the
two global variables—world growth and world FDI—are potentially collinear since growth and FDI
are positively correlated. Lederman et al. (2005) do not discuss this possibility, but we believe it is
not a serious problem. This is because the theoretical relationship between the two, although valid
in both directions, allows only for forward-looking causation. Since the equation to be estimated
includes only the contemporaneous values of these variables, collinearity is likely to be a problem
only to the extent that the current levels of the variables are determined by their past values.25
Another potential problem is the endogeneity of the global FDI variable, since a higher average
value of the dependent variable implies greater global FDI. Although this problem is likely to
be signiﬁcant only if an individual country contributes to a large share of the variation in the
global variable, we believe this possibility should be addressed nonetheless since it implies a direct
correlation between one of the independent variables and the error term. Since the authors do not
consider this in their discussion, we will estimate the replication model as they speciﬁed it and
address this issue when we present our own baseline model in the following section.
We keep all of the local factors considered by Lederman et al. (2005) with the exception of
the current account balance. In contrast to the variables we excluded in the earlier discussion,
the trade deﬁcit enters as a signiﬁcant FDI determinant (with a negative coeﬃcient) in all of the
speciﬁcations presented by the authors. However, their a priori justiﬁcations for including this
variable are not clear—the authors mention that it could take on a positive or a negative sign,
depending on whether it captures the overall ﬁnancing need or macro instability. In the broader
24The instances of the same country pair appearing in multiple PTAs are quite common—see the discussion in
Medvedev (2006), which shows that more than 43% of all country pairs in PTAs are members of more than one
preferential agreement. For example, Kenya and Uganda are both members of the EAC and COMESA, and Georgia
and Armenia are both members of the CIS agreement but also have a bilateral FTA.
25This possibility is not trivial, since both growth and FDI time series are strongly serially correlated. However,
regressing one of the variables on the other yields an insigniﬁcant t-statistic and an R
2 of close to zero, showing that
the statistical relationship between the two is very weak. Furthermore, analysis using variance inﬂation factors (VIF)
shows that most of the variation in each of these variables is independent of the other variable.
17FDI literature, this variable appears with both signs, and its interpretation varies with the sign of
the estimated coeﬃcient (see Chakrabarti (2001) for a more detailed discussion). Since it is not
clear beforehand what this variable is measuring, we choose to exclude it and instead keep inﬂation,
which was not signiﬁcant in any estimates presented by Lederman et al. (2005). If the trade deﬁcit
mainly reﬂects macro instability (as indicated by the estimated negative coeﬃcient in the authors’
results), then the inﬂation variable should pick up that eﬀect once the collinearity between inﬂation
and current account balance is removed by dropping the latter. Furthermore, there are potential
endogeneity problems with including the current account variable, since FDI is part of the balance
of payments and therefore related to the current account. The inﬂation rate is calculated as the
annual percentage change in the consumer price index of each country, where the CPI base year
is 2000 (i.e. CPIi,2000 = 100). The level of per capita income relative to the US is calculated as a
ratio of GNI per capita, i.e. GNIpci,t/GNIpcUSA,t.
We keep the GDP variable in the replication model even though Lederman et al. (2005) ﬁnd
that GDP level has an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on net FDI inﬂows.26 This ﬁnding is a stark contrast to
the existing literature on FDI determinants. For example, Chakrabarti (2001) cites over a dozen
papers that have found a positive eﬀect of market size (deﬁned as absolute GDP, GDP per capita,
GNI, or GNI per capita) on FDI and concludes that “market size has, by far, been the single most
widely accepted ...signiﬁcant determinant of FDI ﬂows.” Therefore, it is very diﬃcult to justify
dropping this variable on theoretical grounds, and we choose to retain it in the replication model.
We use the trade-to-GDP ratio as a measure of the economy’s openness and outward orientation,
and calculate it as (Xit + Mit)/GDPit, where Xit and Mit are merchandise exports and imports,
respectively, of country i in time period t. It should be acknowledged at the outset that the trade-
to-GDP ratio does not necessarily reﬂect the extent of an economy’s outward orientation—among
other things, it could be measuring country size (inversely)—and it could reﬂect either free trade
or interventionist export promotion policies. An alternative measure for openness is tariﬀ levels,
but data is more scarce and there is also less time-series variability, both of which make estimation
more diﬃcult. In addition, according to the ranking of the most robust determinants of FDI by
Chakrabarti (2001), the trade-to-GDP ratio places ﬁve positions above tariﬀ levels. Furthermore,
low tariﬀs do not always indicate a more open economy due to the presence of non-tariﬀ barriers,
which are notoriously diﬃcult to measure.
Endogeneity is a likely problem for both of the above variables. There are many potential chan-
nels through which FDI may aﬀect GDP, the simplest one being that any host country investment
ﬁnanced by FDI is included in the national accounts deﬁnition of GDP. Similarly, there are vari-
ous ways in which FDI and trade may be complements or substitutes—many of which have been
discussed in section 2.3. However, Lederman et al. (2005) do not discuss the potential endogeneity
of either of these variables speciﬁcally and therefore we estimate the replication model without
any corrections.27 We will, however, return to these issues during the discussion of the estimation
results and the motivation for our baseline model in the following section.
The GDP growth rates of individual countries have been calculated as annual percentage
changes, i.e. (xt − xt−1)/xt−1. One potential diﬃculty with using GDP growth rates in a model of
FDI is the probable endogeneity of the two variables. Section 2.5 has noted that there is no cer-
tainty regarding the directions of causation—some studies argue that FDI generates growth while
26The authors, surprisingly, oﬀer no explanation for this result.
27The authors do mention endogeneity as a general problem and report that speciﬁcation testing could not reject
the exogeneity of regressors. However, the comment on speciﬁcation testing appears to refer solely to the GDP growth
variable.
18others suggest that FDI tends to be located in faster-growing economies. However, this endogene-
ity problem is unlikely to arise in our analysis since we model FDI in the current time period as
a function of GDP growth in the previous period. Therefore, we allow previous growth to aﬀect
FDI,28 but the reverse causality is only possible if we accept that current levels of FDI may aﬀect
growth rates in the earlier period. Since the theory only allows for the forward-looking growth-FDI
relationship, it is doubtful that our estimates will suﬀer from this endogeneity problem.29 Another
reason to be optimistic is that the causal links from FDI to growth are usually envisioned as a
long-run phenomenon, and therefore are less likely to be problematic in annual data.
Finally, the institutional quality variables are not included in the replication model because
they are likely to signiﬁcantly limit the sample size due to data availability. In addition, Blonigen
(2005) highlights two other potential diﬃculties in using these variables for empirical FDI analysis.
First, since the indices are usually computed using survey responses, cross-country comparability is
questionable when the composition of respondents varies across countries. Second, since institutions
are quite static, the amount of information that can be extracted from time-series variation in these
variables is likely to be negligible. Furthermore, ﬁxed eﬀects estimation allows us to control for
a number of country-speciﬁc characteristics that display a lot of inertia—such as the quality of
institutions.
Taking into account the above modiﬁcations to the model of Lederman et al. (2005), we are
left with a speciﬁcation in which a country’s net FDI inﬂows are a function of its income level and
growth, per capita income relative to the US, openness, rate of inﬂation, global growth and FDI,
membership in a PTA, and the expectation of joining a preferential agreement. With the exception
of inﬂation, all country-speciﬁc variables are identiﬁed by Chakrabarti (2001) as the most robust
empirical determinants of FDI. The equation to be estimated is:
FDIit = α + γi + β1GDPit + β2OPENit + β3GNIRELit + β4GDPGROit + β5CPIGROit
+ β6WLDFDIt + β7WLDGROt + β8PTAGDPit + β9PTAEXPit + it (1)
where
FDIit is the log of net FDI inﬂows to country i in time period t
α,γi are the constant and country ﬁxed eﬀects
GDPit is the log of GDP of country i in t
OPENit is the trade-to-GDP ratio of i in t
GNIRELit is the ratio of per capita GNI of country i to per capita GNI of the US in t
GDPGROit is the GDP growth rate of i between t and (t − 1)
CPIGROit is the rate of inﬂation in i between t and (t − 1)30
WLDFDIt is the log of net world FDI inﬂows in t31
WLDGROt is the growth rate of world GDP between t and (t − 1)
PTAGDPit is log of the sum of GDP of PTA partners of country i at time t
PTAEXPit is equal to 1 for two years prior to country i joining its ﬁrst PTA
it is the error term
28This is consistent with the arguments of Rodrik (1999).
29The problem may arise nonetheless if both series are highly autocorrelated, although an estimation approach
that explicitly controls for serial correlation should minimize any adverse eﬀects.
30This is equal to the growth rate of the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
31This is calculated using the “world” aggregate of the WDI rather than the sum of net FDI inﬂows in all sample
countries.
19The dataset is an unbalanced panel of 143 high income and developing countries over the 1980–
2003 period.32 All values are expressed in current US dollars.33 Since the dependent variable is
expressed in logs, the estimated coeﬃcients should be interpreted as elasticities and semi-elasticities.
In line with the market size hypothesis, we expect the elasticity of FDI inﬂows with respect to GDP
to be positive. The semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to openness should also be positive as long
as FDI and trade are complements. On the other hand, the semi-elasticity of the relative income
per capita should be negative if this variable is successful in capturing diﬀerences in labor costs
across countries. In other words, if FDI is attracted to markets where real wages are relatively
low (controlling for other determinants) and GNI per capita accurately reﬂects wage diﬀerences,34
countries with low levels of GNI per capita relative to the US should receive more net FDI inﬂows,
after controlling for other factors. We expect the semi-elasticity of GDP growth to be positive,
while the semi-elasticity of inﬂation (which can be interpreted more generally as a measure of
macro instability) should be negative. Turning to the global eﬀects, we expect the world FDI
elasticity to be positive as this variable picks up aggregate FDI trends and globalization eﬀects.
Lederman et al. (2005) argue that the semi-elasticity of individual country FDI inﬂows with respect
to global GDP growth is likely to have a negative value—ceteris paribus, faster growth in the rest
of the world will make the host country a less appealing recipient of FDI. Following the discussion
of section 2.4, we expect the elasticity of FDI with respect to the PTA common market variable
(PTAGDP) to be positive. Finally, the semi-elasticity of expected PTA membership should also
be positive.
Given the longitudinal nature of the dataset, obtaining accurate and consistent estimates is
conditional on the extent to which we are able to account for heterogeneity across countries and
time periods. A standard approach to capturing cross-country variation is the ﬁxed eﬀects method-
ology, which assumes that diﬀerences across countries are systematic manifestations of unobserved
country-speciﬁc characteristics. In recent panel literature, it has become common practice to es-
timate panel models using both country and year ﬁxed eﬀects to capture both the unobserved
country- and year-speciﬁc variation. However, this approach is not appropriate if the vector of
independent variables includes regressors that do not vary within or across countries. This is be-
cause both methods of estimating ﬁxed-eﬀects models—the least squares dummy variables (LSDV)
estimator and the within estimator—cannot properly capture the eﬀects of such variables. For the
former estimator, the time-invariant variables are perfectly collinear with individual ﬁxed eﬀects,
while the country-invariant variables are perfectly collinear with time ﬁxed eﬀects. For the within
estimator, both the time- and country-invariant variables are diﬀerenced away when the model is
speciﬁed with two sets of ﬁxed eﬀects.35 Since equation (1) includes two variables that do not
32The EU-15 is treated as a single country from the beginning of the panel. This choice is driven by several reasons.
First, there are no internal barriers to investment ﬂows within the European Union. Second, the EU negotiates all of
its PTAs as a single bloc, and its PTA partners enjoy equal access to all EU members. Finally, treating the EU-15
as a single country is consistent with the methodology of Medvedev (2006), which adopted a similar treatment in the
context of a gravity model of trade.
33See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of the data sources used in this paper.
34The latter part of the statement is in fact far from certain. We will return to this subject when discussing the
estimation results and their potential problems.
35Consider a simple panel with dimensions N and T, where N is the number of countries and T is the number of time
periods. This panel also contains a certain country-speciﬁc variable zi (i ∈ N) that, for a given country i, is the same
in each time period t (t ∈ T), i.e. zit = zi ∀t. If we estimate this model using ﬁxed eﬀects by manually specifying N
dummy variables (and dropping the constant to avoid the dummy variable trap), the ﬁxed eﬀect for a country i will be




In other words, either the zi variable or the ﬁxed eﬀect can be dropped without any loss in the explanatory power of
20vary across countries—world growth and world FDI—it is not appropriate to include year ﬁxed
eﬀects in the model. This approach also implies a certain degree of imprecision in our results,
since any year-speciﬁc shocks will be to some extent reﬂected in the coeﬃcient estimates of our
global variables. On the other hand, rather than sweeping away all country-invariant time series
heterogeneity into the year ﬁxed eﬀects, this approach allows us to identify the impact of certain
global shocks on individual country FDI inﬂows.
Based on the discussion above, we begin by estimating equation (1) with country ﬁxed eﬀects,
which is also the approach of Lederman et al. (2005). The estimated coeﬃcients, excluding the
constant and individual ﬁxed eﬀects, are shown in Table 3. This speciﬁcation appears to do a good
job of explaining the variation in the dependent variable: the overall R2 is high,36 the F statistic is
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, and a Wald test (F(141,2410) = 15.03,p = 0.00) shows that the ﬁxed
eﬀects are signiﬁcant as a group. Furthermore, the coeﬃcients on all of the model’s control variables
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 percent level or higher, are correctly signed in accordance
with our expectations, and imply reasonable elasticity values. Due to the diﬀerences in data sources,
number of countries considered, and the vector of independent variables, it is not possible to make
exact quantitative comparisons of coeﬃcient values of our model with the estimates of Lederman
et al. (2005). However, our results are also qualitatively diﬀerent from theirs: for example, both
the GDP level and inﬂation are highly signiﬁcant. The former is consistent with a wide majority of
FDI studies mentioned above, and the latter appears to conﬁrm our earlier argument with respect
to macroeconomic instability. With respect to the global variables, Lederman et al. (2005) estimate
that world FDI has a much larger impact than world growth, while we ﬁnd the opposite. Perhaps
the most important diﬀerence, however, rests not with the model’s control variables but with the
two variables measuring preferential liberalization—PTAGDP and PTAEXP. Neither of these
variables is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while Lederman et al. (2005) ﬁnd them signiﬁcant at
5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
The results in Table 3 imply that we cannot establish a statistically signiﬁcant link between
preferential liberalization and net FDI inﬂows using the speciﬁcation of equation (1). One possibil-
ity is that such a relationship does not exist once we broaden our scope to most of the countries and
PTAs in the world. However, it also possible that the relationship is present but the model in equa-
tion (1) is not capable of correctly capturing it due to several potential problems, including model
misspeciﬁcation and the use of inappropriate estimation methods. In the following discussion, we
will identify some of these issues and consider how they might be addressed. This will set the stage
for the next section, which will present an augmented model that takes account of these problems
and becomes the baseline speciﬁcation for this paper. The issues we will focus on include cross-
panel heteroscedasticity and within-panel serial correlation, omitted variables, multicollinearity,
and endogeneity. We address each of these in turn below.
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Empirical tests reveal that the estimates in Table 3
do not account for several important patterns in the model residuals. First, a Breusch-Pagan
the model, since the magnitude of the ﬁxed eﬀect can be scaled in either direction.
If we implement the ﬁxed eﬀects methodology using the within estimator, the outcome is essentially the same.
Recall that in order to avoid the loss in degrees of freedom from specifying a large number of dummies, the within
estimator relies on a simple transformation of the dependent variable (yit − ¯ yi). When the same procedure is applied
to the right hand side of the estimated equation, all time-invariant variables disappear, since zit−¯ zi = zi−zi = 0 (see
chapter 2 of Baltagi (2001) for more details). The same reasoning applies for estimating models with country-invariant
variables under time ﬁxed eﬀects, and panels with more than one set of ﬁxed eﬀects.
36Although the within R
2, arguably a better measure of model performance under the ﬁxed eﬀects approach, is
much more modest at 37.6 precent.
21Table 3: Fixed eﬀects estimation results: net FDI inﬂows













Signiﬁcance levels : † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: The dependent variable is expressed in
natural logarithms.
test reveals the presence of cross-panel heteroscedasticity (χ2 = 239.38,p = 0.00), which, while
leaving coeﬃcient estimates unbiased, can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence standard errors and therefore
aﬀect hypothesis testing. There are a number of statistical techniques that can address this problem
(e.g. weighted least squares), but their applicability and implementation are less clear in a panel
context. Therefore, most panel studies rely on the Huber-White sandwich method to calculate
robust standard errors, which represent consistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix in
the presence of heteroscedasticity. In the context of estimates in Table 3, however, it turns out
that heteroscedasticity is not a signiﬁcant problem since robust estimation does not qualitatively
change the results—even though the standard errors increase by as much as 100 percent in some
cases, it is not enough to push the signiﬁcance level of any of the local or global coeﬃcients below
the 5 percent threshold.37
In addition to heteroscedasticity, the estimates in Table 3 are also aﬀected by serial correlation.
In particular, a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data rejects the null of no ﬁrst order
serial correlation (F(1,138) = 103.032,p = 0.00). The consequences of autocorrelation are similar to
heteroscedasticity, but the problems caused by the latter are usually more severe. OLS coeﬃcient
estimates remain consistent and unbiased in the presence of autocorrelation, but they are no longer
best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) or asymptotically eﬃcient. Furthermore, autocorrelation
causes standard errors to be biased. Corrections for autocorrelation range from OLS estimation
with Newey-West standard errors to Cochrane-Orcutt or Prais-Winsten transformations, which
generalize to two-step feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) in panel data. However, the latter
become incomparable with the more simple OLS-based approaches, both because coeﬃcient signs
and magnitudes can change quite drastically and because the properties of the FGLS estimators
are only known asymptotically (i.e. hypothesis testing is based on the z rather than t statistics). In
addition, if both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are present in the data, a three-step FGLS
approach is required, further complicating comparisons with OLS/LSDV-type models.38
37See Table 11 in Appendix B for estimates of equation (1) using the Huber-White robust standard errors.
38To illustrate this, Table 11 in Appendix B presents three-step FGLS estimates of equation (1). The results
22Omitted variables. A notable omission from the set of regressors in equation (1) is the exchange
rate, which is cited in many studies as a critical determinant of FDI (see, for example, Chakrabarti,
2001). The most basic theories of the relationship between exchange rate movements and FDI
argue that a real depreciation of home currency reduces production costs for foreign investors and
therefore attracts FDI inﬂows (see, for instance, Cushman, 1985). In addition, a real depreciation
lowers foreigners’ costs of acquiring domestic assets, which should also stimulate FDI. In more
recent theoretical models, the link between exchange rate movements and FDI is assumed to work
through capital market imperfections, since the stream of income in a weak currency is subject
to greater risk and is therefore capitalized at a higher rate. For instance, Froot and Stein (1991)
suggest that under information asymmetries, monitoring costs cause external ﬁnancing to be more
expensive than internal ﬁnancing. In this situation, depreciation of the domestic currency not
only increases the relative wealth of foreigners, but also increases the relative rate of return for
foreign ﬁrms who can invest in domestic assets without incurring the monitoring penalty, therefore
encouraging additional FDI. Blonigen (1997) also proposes a positive link between exchange rate
depreciation and FDI, although his reasoning diﬀers from that of the previous authors: even if
domestic and foreign ﬁrms may have the same opportunities to purchase domestic assets, these
assets can generate returns in currencies other than those used for purchase, which tends to favor
foreign investors.
There are several other explanatory variables that could be added to the model speciﬁcation,
most notably some measure of tax policy. However, to the extent that tax codes tend to be rather
static and are not revised frequently, a ﬁxed eﬀects methodology may eﬀectively control for tax
policy just as it should capture cross-country diﬀerences in the quality of institutions. Therefore,
we focus on the exchange rate as the main omission from the set of control variables in equation
(1).39
Turning now to the hypothesized PTA-FDI relationship, it is worth investigating whether the
extended market size variable is suﬃcient to capture the potential links between membership in
PTAs and changes in net FDI inﬂows. We have already mentioned that it is not appropriate to add a
PTA dummy to a speciﬁcation that includes the PTAGDP variable—the coeﬃcient on the dummy
is insigniﬁcant and its presence is likely to cause multicollinearity problems. However, some other
PTA-related variables may be more promising. For example, section 2.4 has argued that economic
and geographic proximity may be an important component of any relationship between PTAs and
FDI based on the extended common market hypothesis. For example, while it is quite easy to
imagine a ﬁrm beneﬁting from economies of scale by serving both US and Canadian markets under
NAFTA, it is much more diﬃcult to propose that the same relationship holds for the US-Chile FTA
and even more so for the US-Jordan agreement. Therefore, distance may be an important factor in
determining the strength of the PTA-FDI relationship, and omitting this variable from the model
speciﬁcation could bias the extended market size coeﬃcient. Similar to gravity models of trade,
the underlying assumption does not postulate that distance itself makes trading or investing more
costly, but rather that transaction costs tend to be increasing with the distance between countries.
The immediate application of this variable rests with models of bilateral FDI (see Levy Yeyati et al.
are very diﬀerent from before, indicating that autocorrelation is in fact a signiﬁcant problem in our sample. Note
that these estimates are shown largely for illustrative purposes, since the model continues to be aﬀected by several
speciﬁcation problems that will be highlighted in the following discussion. More details on the FGLS estimator will
also be provided below.
39More precisely, the missing variable is the change in the exchange rate rather than its level. Some empirical
studies have also used exchange rate volatility as an independent variable, but that is more indicative of macro
instability than the relative wealth and capital market eﬀects described in the previous paragraph.
23(2003) and Adams et al. (2003), both of whom ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative impact of distance on
outward FDI stocks). However, even in the context of net FDI inﬂows per country, one might expect
that more FDI is likely to take place between neighboring members of a preferential agreement.
On the other hand, to the extent that trade volumes are negatively related to distance and trade
and FDI may be substitutes, we could see a positive relationship between distance and net FDI
inﬂows. Therefore, while the expected sign of this variable is not clear and likely depends on the
purpose of investment (i.e. whether FDI is market-seeking, tariﬀ-jumping, etc.), in either case it
could be an important determinant of net FDI inﬂows between PTA partners.
Multicollinearity. A high level of correlation among regressors is quite common in time-series
data. However, collinearity among the model’s independent variables inﬂates standard errors and
results in overﬁtting, potentially over-estimating the eﬀects of some collinear variables and under-
estimating the eﬀects of others. There are few formal tests for multicollinearity, and the applicability
of existing ones (such as VIF) to panel data is not entirely clear. Nonetheless, simply regressing one
of the collinear variables on the other (and controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects in panel data) is often enough
to determine the severity of the problem. We have already mentioned multicollinearity issues while
discussing the potential correlation between global growth and global FDI, where we concluded
that the contribution of one variable to explaining changes in the other is minimal. Other potential
multicollinearity problems in the model described by equation (1) include correlation between the
level of GDP and openness, as well as GDP and relative GNI per capita.
One of the reasons GDP and openness may be collinear is that smaller countries tend to have
larger trade-to-GDP ratios. However, the within-panel (time-series) correlation, which is much more
important for panel analysis using ﬁxed eﬀects, is very low. In an LSDV regression of openness
on GDP the overall R2 is just under three percent, while the within R2 is around one percent.40
Thus, although the two variables are negatively correlated, as indicated by a signiﬁcant t-statistic,
the variation in one variable explains only a small fraction of variation in the other, and therefore
multicollinearity is unlikely to pose a serious problem for estimation of partial eﬀects of GDP and
openness on net FDI inﬂows.
Unfortunately, the same conclusion cannot be drawn for GDP and relative GNI per capita.
While Lederman et al. (2005) claim that the latter is indicative of real labor costs, it is quite
likely that both variables may capture the eﬀects of market size.41 In fact, when regressing one
variable on the other (and using ﬁxed eﬀects) we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive slope coeﬃcient
and an R2 of almost 16 percent.42 Therefore, the relatively high correlation between these two
variables is likely to cause estimation problems. This is evident from the results of Table 11 in
Appendix B, where the relative GNI variable switches signs when we move from one estimation
approach to another. While there are approaches that provide consistent estimates in the presence
of multicollinearity (e.g. principal components), these have usually not been generalized to panel
settings and do not control for other problems such as heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. In
such instances, the more common approach has been to drop the problematic variable or, if the
theory demands its inclusion, to estimate the model as is and note that standard errors are likely
to be inﬂated and coeﬃcients unstable. Since equation (1) already includes a control for market
size, we do not need to add another measure of size to the model. Since relative GNI is intended
to capture diﬀerences in relative labor costs, it would be preferable to use real wage data in its
40See Appendix B for the estimation results.
41See, for example, an earlier reference to the discussion of market size in Chakrabarti (2001), who includes GNI
per capita in the list of variables that reﬂect it.
42See Appendix B for the estimation results.
24place. However, this is problematic for several reasons: data on wages is quite scarce, reliability
and cross-country comparability are highly questionable, and the level of aggregation is not clear
(i.e. whether one should focus on skilled wages vs. overall, urban vs. economywide, etc.). Therefore,
the best approach seems to be to drop the relative GNI per capita and rely on the ﬁxed eﬀects to
capture some of the cross-country variation in wage levels.
Endogeneity. In the course of the previous discussion, we have already mentioned potential
endogeneity problems with GDP, openness, GDP growth, and global FDI.43 Endogeneity, or two-
way causality, presents problems not only for inference but also for estimation, since the right hand
side variable is potentially correlated with the variation in the dependent variable that is relegated to
the error term. Thus, the Cov[,X] = 0 assumption is violated, and consistent estimation requires
obtaining instrument(s) that are uncorrelated with the error term. In fact, both of the commonly
used endogeneity tests—the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and the C-statistic (the diﬀerence-in-Sargan
statistic)—rely on comparing regression results before and after applying the instruments. In order
to test a subset of orthogonality conditions (i.e. the exogeneity of one or more instruments), both
tests contrast the eﬃcient, but potentially inconsistent estimates before the IV procedure with the
consistent, but possibly ineﬃcient IV estimates. If the pre-IV estimates are found to be inconsistent,
the variables in question are deemed endogenous and instrumentation is warranted.
A common problem for this type of analysis is coming up with a set of instruments that simul-
taneously exhibit a high correlation with the endogenous variable(s) and no correlation with the
error term. In some instances, the instrument choice is obvious. For example, consider the global
FDI variable, which is problematic because it is determined by a combination of left-hand side
values for all the sample countries. While it is possible to instrument world FDI with a suﬃcient
number of its own lags, a more direct approach is to remove the endogeneity by subtracting each
country’s net FDI inﬂows from the global value. In this case, the remainder will still control for
global FDI patterns but the relationship with the error term in each panel will be removed.
The choice of instruments is not so obvious for GDP and the trade-to-GDP ratio. We have
already mentioned that tariﬀ levels are not an attractive measure of openness due to data availability
and the ambigious relationship between the level of tariﬀs and the outward orientation of the
economy.44 Various openness indices, such as those constructed by Sachs and Warner (1995), have
been widely criticized for capturing a whole range of policies not directly related to an economy’s
outward orientation. Finally, instrumenting the trade-to-GDP ratio with its own lags is problematic
in annual data because this variable does not vary much through time. It is partly due to these
issues that a number of FDI studies have treated the openness variable as exogenous, despite the
potential two-way causality between trade and FDI (see, for example, Asiedu, 2002; Kolstad and
Tondel, 2002; Addison and Heshmati, 2003).
In contrast to endogeneity tests, which require the user to pick a set of instruments a priori,
Addison and Heshmati (2003) suggest the use of the Granger causality concept in order to establish
the direction of causality between the model variables.45 We follow this approach and regress the
43Note that we have already established that endogeneity is unlikely to be a problem for the GDP growth variable,
and we therefore will not address it in the following discussion.
44This is largely due to the presence of non-tariﬀ barriers, which are highly distortionary yet diﬃcult to quantify. In
addition, there is no agreement in the literature on whether simple or trade-weighted average tariﬀs are the preferred
vehicle: simple averages attach too much weight to tariﬀ peaks and valleys, while weighted averages ignore highly
protected sectors.
45This approach is a nice alternative because endogeneity tests do not actually test for endogeneity of the variables
but rather for exogeneity of the instruments. In addition, the implementation of the available endogeneity tests in
the presence of serial correlation is not clear.
25log of net FDI inﬂows on its three lagged values, as well as three lagged values of the trade-to-GDP
ratio and a set of country ﬁxed eﬀects.46 The results, shown in Appendix B, indicate that openness
plays a signiﬁcant role in determining net FDI inﬂows, judging by a relatively high coeﬃcient value
and a signiﬁcant t-statistic. In testing the Granger causality in the opposite direction, we ﬁnd that
FDI also causes openness, but the coeﬃcient magnitudes are much smaller and their signiﬁcance is
also much lower. Therefore, although Granger causality appears to go in both directions, the link
from openness to net FDI inﬂows is much stronger than the opposite. Taking this into account,
together with a lack of good instruments and the large body of research that has treated this
variable as exogenous, we believe it may be appropriate to leave this variable in the model without
instrumenting while remaining aware of its potential diﬃculties.
Another variable thay may give rise to endogeneity problems is the level of GDP. The most direct
cause for endogeneity concerns is the fact that domestic investment ﬁnanced by FDI is included
in the deﬁnition of GDP; other arguments note that the level of GDP is an indication of long-run
growth rates that may be aﬀected by FDI. These and other potential endogeneity problems with
GDP are non-trivial, and have prompted several studies to move the GDP level to the left-hand
side, estimating FDI as a share of GDP (see, for example, Asiedu, 2002; Addison and Heshmati,
2003). One problem with this approach is that the FDI-to-GDP ratio is as likely to be a measure of
the host country’s openness as its market size. Furthermore, the same studies also usually include
the trade-to-GDP ratio as a right-hand side variable, which is likely to give rise to endogeneity
concerns highlighted in the previous paragraph. IV estimation is an alternative approach, but,
as with openness, the choice of instruments is not obvious (if anything, it is less so, as evidenced
by the vast literature on the determinants of GDP growth). Therefore, in order to gauge the
magnitude of the potential endogeneity problems, we employ the same Granger causality tests as
in the earlier paragraph. The results are shown in Table 13 in Appendix B and suggest that the
causality from GDP to FDI is much stronger than the causality from FDI to GDP.47 This suggests
that endogeneity may not be a signiﬁcant problem in our sample. Furthermore, we have made
previous references to the extensive literature that has established a robust positive relationship
between FDI on the left-hand side and market size (GDP) on the right. In fact, Chakrabarti (2001)
concludes that market size is the only determinant of FDI that is always signiﬁcant and completely
robust to changes in the information set. Thus, similar to openness, we choose to leave this variable
in the model without further adjustments.
4.2 Baseline model
Taking into account potential shortcomings and estimation issues in the replication estimates dis-
cussed in the previous section, we propose an augmented speciﬁcation of equation (1). We drop
the relative GNI and expected PTA dummy variables from the model, add measures of the real
exchange rate and distance to PTA partners, change the deﬁnition of global FDI, and leave the
expected PTA dummy for speciﬁcation testing at a later point. The new model therefore has the
following speciﬁcation:
FDIit = α + γi + β1GDPit + β2OPENit + β3GDPGROit + β4CPIGROit + β5RERGROit
+ β6WLDFDIadjit + β7WLDGROt + β8PTAGDPit + β9DISTAit + it (2)
46The lag length was chosen after speciﬁcation testing with several alternative lag structures.
47The mean and variance of both variables are very similar, therefore the diﬀerence in coeﬃcient magnitudes across
the two regressions is not due to an inappropriate choice of scale.
26The RERGRO variable is the annual percentage change in the real eﬀective exchange rate
(REER) index of country i. The REER has a base year of 2000 (i.e. REERi,2000 = 100) and is
obtained from the WDI database of the World Bank. According to the WDI documentation, this
variable is calculated in two steps. First, WDI computes a nominal eﬀective exchange rate as a
weighted average of a basket of foreign currencies.48 Second, the nominal rate is deﬂated by an
indicator of manufacturing unit labor costs for high income countries and changes in consumer
prices for others. Since the deﬁnition of the REER series is based on the inverse quote of the
nominal exchange rate, an increase in the value of the real exchange rate (that is, a positive value
for RERGRO) implies a real appreciation of the domestic currency. Therefore, based on the
discussion in the previous sub-section, we expect a negative relationship between changes in the
real eﬀective exchange rate and net FDI inﬂows.
The WLDFDIadj variable represents an adjustment to the deﬁnition of global FDI discussed
in the earlier sub-section. This new variable is calculated as (WLDFDIt − FDIit) to remove the
two-way causality between world FDI and the dependent variable. As before, this variable should
pick up aggregate trends in FDI and globalization eﬀects, and therefore we expect its coeﬃcient to
be positive.
The third new variable, DISTA, is the log of average distance between country i and all of
its PTA partners at time t. This variable is equal to zero when a country is not a member of any
PTAs, and has a time series dimension since its value is updated every time a country enters into









for each country i and every
year t, where distij is the great circle distance between the largest or capital cities of countries i
and j and N is the number of country i’s PTA partners.49 For the reasons discussed previously, we
expect to ﬁnd a negative elasticity of net FDI inﬂows with respect to distance to PTA partners.
In order to simultaneously account for heteroscedasticity across panels and serial correlation
within panels, we rely on a three-step feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator. The
advantage of this approach is that it allows estimation in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation
within panels and cross-sectional correlation and/or heteroscedasticity across panels. However, the
use of this estimator is conditional on having a suﬃcient number of degrees of freedom, since it
must generate additional estimates of the variance, covariance, and serial correlation parameters.
The standard version of the FGLS estimator in the presence of both heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation is a three-step process: in the ﬁrst step, the model assumes homoscedastic errors and
calculates consistent estimates of the AR(1) parameter(s); in the second step, a groupwise het-
eroscedastic model is applied to the transformed data (which is now free of autocorrelation); and in
the third step, the new moment matrix is used to solve the full FGLS system and obtain the correct
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for ˆ β. The autoregressive parameters can be cross-section-
speciﬁc or constrained to be the same across all cross-sections, with the latter increasing eﬃciency
and improving the small sample performance of the estimator. The third step can be iterated to
convergence, although Greene (2000) notes that no asymptotic gains can be expected from itera-
tion since the estimator is eﬃcient at every step. Furthermore, while the iterated FGLS estimator
48The WDI provides the following information on this variable: “A nominal eﬀective exchange rate index represents
the ratio (expressed on the base 2000 = 100) of an index of a currency’s period-average exchange rate to a weighted
geometric average of exchange rates for currencies of selected countries and the euro area. For most high-income
countries, weights are derived from trade in manufactured goods among industrial countries. For selected other
countries the nominal eﬀective exchange rate index is based on each countrys trade in both manufactured goods and
primary products with its partner or competitor countries.”
49The distance series has been obtained from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales
(CEPII ). See Appendix A for more details.
27converges to the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) in models without serial correlation, the
same does not hold when the disturbances are assumed to follow an AR(1) process. Therefore,
we elect to use the simpler three-step methodology; in any case, for the model in equation (2)
the diﬀerences between the results generated by the two estimators are marginal and do not aﬀect
hypothesis testing or inference.50 Similarly, allowing the AR(1) coeﬃcients to vary across countries
or constraining them to be the same does not appreciably change the results, and we therefore opt
for the more eﬃcient method of imposing a common autoregressive parameter for all cross-sections.
Table 4: FGLS estimation results: net FDI inﬂows













Signiﬁcance levels : † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: The dependent variable is expressed in
natural logarithms.
The FGLS estimates of equation (2) are shown in Table 4. Because the REER data are not avail-
able for all sample countries and periods, the number of observations shrinks to 1541—representing
an unbalanced panel of 87 countries between 1980 and 2004. This also limits the coverage of PTAs
in our sample to 180 agreements, down from the original 196. The Wald test (summarized by the
χ2 statistic in the last row of the table) is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level and shows that the inde-
pendent variables are signiﬁcant as a group. The individual coeﬃcient estimates are all signiﬁcant
at the ten percent level or below and imply reasonable elasticity values. The estimated elasticity
of net FDI inﬂows with respect to market size (GDP) is slightly below unity (but signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from it) and is broadly consistent with estimates in the previous literature. For example,
Kolstad and Tondel (2002) obtain an elasticity estimate of slightly higher than one using gross FDI
per capita as a dependent variable, while Coughlin and Segev (2000) estimate a similar elasticity
with gross FDI data for China.51 No such comparisons can be drawn for the semi-elasticity of trade
openness, since the exact deﬁnition of this variable varies widely across studies. GDP growth has a
positive eﬀect on net FDI inﬂows while the impact of inﬂation is negative but relatively small and
only borderline signiﬁcant (p = 0.099). The estimated coeﬃcients on the global variables—world
50The standard errors are somewhat larger for the three-step estimator, therefore presenting the three-step results
allows us to err on the side of caution.
51Other studies, such as Asiedu (2002) and Addison and Heshmati (2003), impose a unitary elasticity by moving
GDP to the left-hand side. Although our estimated elasticity of net FDI inﬂows with respect to GDP is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from unity (χ
2=34.09, p = 0.00), the absolute value of the coeﬃcient is reasonably close to one.
28growth and world FDI—are consistent with our expectations and show that faster growth in the
rest of the world (controlling for home country growth) makes a particular nation a less attractive
location for FDI, while rising total world FDI tends to increase net FDI inﬂows for an average host
country.52 The coeﬃcient on world FDI is signiﬁcantly less than one, which can be due to one or
both of the following reasons: either our sample omits some increasingly important recipients of
FDI, or the distribution of net FDI inﬂows across sample countries is highly unequal and biased
toward a small group of large recipients.53 The coeﬃcient on the growth rate of the real eﬀective
exchange rate is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level and correctly signed. The negative elasticity of
net FDI inﬂows with respect to RERGRO implies that the appreciation of the real exchange rate
leads to reduced FDI inﬂows, consistent with theoretical expectations.54
Turning to the variables capturing the eﬀects of preferential liberalization, the size of the ex-
tended common market is signiﬁcant at the one percent level and positively related to net FDI
inﬂows. As mentioned earlier, this variable serves a two-fold purpose in the estimation routine.
First, since it is equal to zero prior to signing a PTA and carries a positive value afterward, it
measures the threshold eﬀect of signing an agreement on FDI inﬂows. Furthermore, this variable
also captures the eﬀects of participating in a larger market following the signing of an agreement.
This is particularly important if a country is party to more than one PTA, since PTAGDP will
then be a sum of all of its partners’ GDP, reﬂecting the fact that the country has now created a
larger market. The fact that this variable is positive and signiﬁcant shows that at least one of two
mechanisms is present in the data: signing a PTA is associated with increased beneﬁts in terms of
greater net FDI inﬂows, and/or larger market size of the country’s PTA partners tends to generate
larger net FDI inﬂows. The coeﬃcient magnitude suggests that a one percent increase in the size
of an average country’s extended market tends to expand net FDI inﬂows by 0.06 percent. This
elasticity is signiﬁcantly below the 0.1 value estimated by Lederman et al. (2005), but the order
of magnitude is similar. Admittedly, our estimated elasticity is small; however, note that joining
new PTAs will often imply much larger changes in the value of PTAGDP, especially for PTAs
with multiple and/or high-income partners. To quantify this statement, consider the example of
Costa Rica. By 2004, the country was a member of several PTAs, including the Central American
Common Market, Association of Caribbean States, and bilateral agreements with Argentina, Chile,
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Canada. If Costa Rica were to join CAFTA
(which includes the United States) in the same year, our model would predict an 11.5 percent
increase in its net FDI inﬂows.55 On the other hand, were it instead to join a PTA with Ecuador,
Costa Rica could only expect its net FDI inﬂows to rise by 0.08 percent. For Nicaragua, which
has fewer PTAs (but is still a member of the CACM and CAFTA), the expected changes would
be 27 and 0.8 percent, respectively.56 In addition, both countries could expect additional dynamic
52The coeﬃcient on global growth is only signiﬁcant at the nine percent level (p = 0.083).
53Ceteris paribus, a more unequal distribution will result in lower slope estimates with least squares. For example,
in 2004 the top ﬁve recipients of FDI in our sample received 80 percent of global FDI, while the top ten received 86
percent.
54To the extent that FDI is a long-term decision to enter a particular market, it may be surprising to ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of annual movements in the real exchange rate. However, using longer-term moving averages of
the REER is likely to eliminate some variation in this variable (making estimation more diﬃcult) and is also more
indicative of overall macro instability rather than relative wealth eﬀects or short-term imperfections in the capital
markets.
55This is equivalent to joining a bilateral PTA with the United States, since Costa Rica already has preferential
access to all the other countries in CAFTA through its existing PTAs.
56These numbers are obtained as ﬁtted values from the model estimates shown in Table 4. It is important to
recognize that they are not forecasts and are provided only to illustrate the relevant orders of magnitude. A number
29FDI gains from their partnership with the USA as the income of the latter rises over time and that
change is reﬂected in the value of PTAGDP.
Finally, the coeﬃcient on the average distance variable is negative and signiﬁcant at the one
percent level, conﬁrming our earlier hypothesis that proximity to PTA partners is an important
determinant of FDI inﬂows following preferential liberalization. Furthermore, this indicates that
the coeﬃcient on PTAGDP would be biased if the distance relationship were not taken into
account. The negative coeﬃcient on distance also means that, controlling for other factors, an
average country receives less net FDI inﬂows from its more distant PTA partners. Therefore, this
ﬁnding goes against the hypothesis that countries rely on FDI rather than trade to serve more
distant PTA markets, although clearly it does not constitute conclusive proof. The elasticity value
suggests that increasing the average distance to one’s PTA partners by one percent lowers net FDI
inﬂows by 0.16 percent. To continue with the example of Costa Rica, accounting for the fact that
joining CAFTA would increase the country’s average distance to PTA partners lowers the expected
FDI beneﬁt from 11.5 percent to 11.1 percent. On the other hand, if the United States were as far
from Costa Rica as, say, Germany, the expected increase in net FDI inﬂows would be limited to
9.6 percent.
Overall, the model summarized by equation (2) appears to be not only a good predictor of
net FDI inﬂows by country, but also a successful approach to capturing the relationship between
preferential trade liberalization and FDI. The control variables are signiﬁcant and correctly signed,
and the PTA-related variables establish a positive link between net FDI inﬂows and the size of
the extended common market and a negative link between net FDI inﬂows and the distance to
PTA partners. However, in order to obtain these results we made numerous adjustments to the
estimates shown in Table 3, including changing the estimation approach, reducing the sample
size, redeﬁning one independent variable, dropping two others, and adding two new regressors. In
order to determine which of these changes are responsible for making the PTA-related variables
statistically signiﬁcant, we undertake some simple speciﬁcation tests of equations (1) and (2). The
detailed results are presented in Appendix B.1 and B.4, and show that reductions in the sample size
do not qualitatively aﬀect our estimates. Estimating equation (1) with FGLS instead of ﬁxed eﬀects
yields point estimates closer to Table 4, but the coeﬃcient on PTAGDP is ﬁve times smaller and
the coeﬃcients on distance, host country growth, and global growth are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. On the other hand, estimating equation (2) with ﬁxed eﬀects results in signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
estimates for all variables except the REER growth rate, while using the FGLS estimator makes
RERGRO signiﬁcant and changes the point estimates of coeﬃcients. Both the GDPGRO and
WLDGRO variables appear to be sensitive to the inclusion of the REER growth variable—they
are only signiﬁcant in the presence of the latter, while the point estimates and signiﬁcance levels
of other model variables remain largely unchanged. Excluding average distance does not aﬀect
the coeﬃcients on the control variables or their signiﬁcance, while signiﬁcantly lowering the point
estimate of PTAGDP. This is likely due to the fact that the PTAGDP variable now controls for
both the positive eﬀects of joining a PTA and having access to a larger market, and the negative
eﬀects of being located farther away from PTA partners. Overall, changes in the model speciﬁcation
(particularly dropping the GNIREL variable) appear to be the main reason behind the signiﬁcant
estimates of PTA-related variables. Using FGLS instead of ﬁxed eﬀects has moderate eﬀects on the
estimates by making RERGRO signiﬁcant and changing coeﬃcient magnitudes. Finally, reducing
the sample size from 2561 to 1541 observations appears to have negligible eﬀects.
of assumptions underlie these calculations, including coeﬃcient stability, independence, and model relevance for
out-of-sample predictions.
30These results provide a “two-handed” answer to the central question of this section: can the
positive PTA-FDI relationship documented by earlier studies be veriﬁed in our sample? On the
one hand, we do ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant positive elasticity of net FDI inﬂows with respect to the
PTAGDP variable. On the other hand, this relationship is signiﬁcant only once we control for
non-orthogonal errors, multicollinearity, endogeneity, and add the REER variable. The model sum-
marized by equation (2) therefore becomes our baseline speciﬁcation, and subsequent subsections
will rely on it to examine some alternative measures of the PTA variable and to implement some
simple decompositions by income level, geographic region, and time period.
4.3 Model extensions: alternative speciﬁcations of the PTA variable
In this subsection, we consider some alternative approaches to capturing the potential links between
preferential trade liberalization and FDI. These will involve investigating diﬀerent ways of deﬁning
some variables, as well as including additional variables that may enhance the explanatory power
of the model and improve our understanding of the underlying data. The ﬁrst set of experiments
concerns the distance variable, which was conﬁrmed by our previous estimates as an important
determinant of the FDI-PTA relationship. Some speciﬁcation tests will help to ascertain whether
alternative measures of distance may improve our estimates and show the results of these explo-
rations in Table 5. For ease of reference and comparison, the ﬁrst column reports the estimated
coeﬃcients from the baseline model, as shown in Table 4. All of the estimates are obtained using
the three-step FGLS estimator. As before, we omit the constant from the list of variables shown,
although each model was estimated with an intercept term included.
We begin by attempting to diﬀerentiate between equidistant partners according to their relative
market size. For example, consider Mexico and two of its PTAs: NAFTA and the Mexico-Israel
bilateral FTA. It would seem likely that Mexico’s FDI beneﬁts are maximized by the fact that it is
located closer to its larger partner, USA, as opposed to the much smaller partner, Israel. In order
to reﬂect the importance of relative proximity to large PTA partners, we specify a new variable
DISTW, which is the average GDP-weighted distance between country i and its PTA partners.









for every country i and year t, and,
similar to its simple average counterpart, is equal to zero when a country has not entered into any
PTAs and is updated dynamically when a new PTA with country i enters into force.
The estimation results from substituting GDP-weighted distance for average distance in the
net FDI equation are shown in column (2) of Table 5. The coeﬃcients on the control variables
change marginally while their signiﬁcance levels remain unchanged. The Wald test shows that
model coeﬃcients maintain their signiﬁcance as a group (p = 0.00). However, neither of the PTA-
related variables is signiﬁcant individually. Although it is diﬃcult to establish the exact reason for
this result, the loss of signiﬁcance could be due to multicollinearity problems, since the size of the
extended common market is used to calculate the weighted distance.
While adding GDP-weighted distance to the estimated equation does not appear to be a use-
ful approach to estimating the eﬀects of proximity to PTA partners on FDI inﬂows, there is an
alternative way to introduce this variable into the model speciﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, we could use
distance between diﬀerent PTA partners to assign weights to the PTAGDP variable itself, so that
the GDP of more distant partners is discounted relative to the more proximate countries. The new









for every country i and year t.
Therefore, PTA partners that are located closer than the average for country i receive weights that
are greater than one, while countries further away than the average are assigned weights of less
31Table 5: FGLS estimation results with alternative deﬁnitions of distance: net FDI inﬂows
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coeﬃcient
GDP 0.899∗∗ 0.900∗∗ 0.899∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
OPEN 0.941∗∗ 0.922∗∗ 0.909∗∗
(0.083) (0.081) (0.080)
GDPGRO 0.256† 0.266† 0.261†
(0.142) (0.143) (0.143)
CPIGRO -0.008† -0.008† -0.008†
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
RERGRO -0.336∗ -0.320∗ -0.317∗
(0.146) (0.147) (0.147)
WLDGRO -0.677† -0.653† -0.636
(0.391) (0.394) (0.393)










N 1541 1541 1541
Log-lhd -1716.811 -1720.753 -1721.06
χ2 3146.643 3186.223 3178.957
Signiﬁcance levels: † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The de-
pendent variable is expressed in natural logarithms.
Column (1) reproduces the results from Table 4.
than one. In terms of the model in equation (2), the new PTAGDPw variable replaces both the
PTAGDP and DISTA variables. The estimation results are shown in column (3) of Table 5.
The coeﬃcients on the control variables are again similar to the reference speciﬁcation in column
(1), and the new distance-weighted PTA common market variable has the expected positive sign
and is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Although the world growth variable loses its signiﬁcance
at conventional conﬁdence levels, the actual change in the p-value is quite small, going up from
0.083 to 0.106. In accordance with expectations, the elasticity of net FDI inﬂows with respect
to PTAGDPw is much smaller than the PTAGDP elasticity from column (1), implying that the
negative eﬀects of distance from PTA partners have been incorporated into the estimate. Therefore,
the results of Table 5 conﬁrm our earlier hypothesis that proximity to PTA partners is an important
determinant of net FDI inﬂows following preferential liberalization. Given our earlier criticisms of
the PTAGDP variable, its weighted version is better suited to capture the heterogeneity of the
32relationship between PTAs and net FDI inﬂows. However, using PTAGDP and DISTA together
is more appealing because it allows us to decompose the total eﬀect of PTAs on FDI into market
size and distance components. Therefore, we will stick with equation (2) as the most appropriate
model of the relationship between preferential trade liberalization and net FDI inﬂows.
The next set of experiments is presented in Table 6. First, we address the issue of how we
measure the size of a PTA market area. Most gravity models of trade include a combined GDP
term that is the product, not the sum, of individual members’ GDP. The reasoning behind this
speciﬁcation is the argument that countries of like size are more likely to generate signiﬁcant trade
ﬂows than a large and a small partner of equal total size.57 A similar argument can be extended
to FDI, since a small country is likely to have a limited capacity to absorb investment inﬂows.
Therefore, we would like to use an alternative speciﬁcation in which the extended market size








j lnGDPij and j ranges over all of the PTA partners
of country i. However, this deﬁnition causes scaling problems in the model since the multiplicative
term can become extremely large very quickly and the logarithmic transformation fails to condense
the right tail of the distribution suﬃciently.58 Therefore, we impose an additional transformation




and setting its value at 1 when a
country does not belong to any PTAs.59 The inverse transformation, being the strongest of the
three common transformations to reduce positive skewness while maintaining the relative order of
data points (they are, in order, square root, logarithmic, and inverse), is successful in lengthening
the left tail and compressing the right tail enough to address scaling issues in the model. However,
applying this double transformation implies that the estimated coeﬃcient will no longer have an
intuitive interpretation as an elasticity, and also that the PTAGDPm variable is expected to enter
the model with a negative sign. That is, an increase in the size of the PTA external common market
will cause the PTAGDPm variable to become smaller in absolute value, which, if the hypothesized
positive link between preferential liberalization and FDI holds in the multiplicative version of the
model, should lead to an increase in the value of the dependent variable.
The estimated coeﬃcients of the new model are shown in column (2) of Table 6 (for comparison
purposes, the ﬁrst column again repeats the baseline estimates). The estimated coeﬃcients on
the control variables are close to the baseline speciﬁcation and largely retain their signiﬁcance
(the p-value on global growth rises from 0.083 to 0.107). However, neither the new multiplicative
market size variable nor the average distance are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (the relevant p-
values are 0.124 and 0.241, respectively). These results are likely due to the complicated nature of
the PTAGDPm variable. Furthermore, the point value of the estimated PTAGDPm coeﬃcient
suggests a very diﬀerent elasticity value from the baseline speciﬁcation. The implied elasticity of
the multiplicative common market size (calculated at the sample mean) is 0.0003 percent compared
to 0.06 percent in the baseline model. Therefore, even if we were to accept coeﬃcient signiﬁcance
at the 13 percent levels, the eﬀect of this variable on net FDI inﬂows is clearly negligible. One
57Another reason why a multiplicative GDP term is often used is that it is implied by the CES functional form,
which underpins most gravity models. See Appendix B of Medvedev (2006) for more details on the theory behind
gravity models.
58For an extreme case, consider a country like Tunisia, which is a member of several PTAs in Africa and the Middle
East. When it signs a PTA with the European Union in 1998, its already considerable extended market size is now
multiplied by the entire GDP of the EU, causing the common market variable (in logs!) to increase by a factor of
almost ten. On the other end of the spectrum, countries that are not a member of a single PTA have the extended
market size variable set at zero. As a result, the distribution of the extended market variable in multiplicative form
is much wider than any of the other variables in the model, and estimation becomes problematic.
59We change the variable name to reﬂect its multiplicative nature.
33Table 6: Alternative PTA speciﬁcation estimation results: net FDI inﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Coeﬃcient
GDP 0.899∗∗ 0.906∗∗ 0.900∗∗ 0.879∗∗ 0.898∗∗ 0.910∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
OPEN 0.941∗∗ 0.905∗∗ 0.904∗∗ 0.899∗∗ 0.945∗∗ 0.785∗∗
(0.083) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.083) (0.107)
GDPGRO 0.256† 0.263† 0.261† 0.271† 0.260† 0.342∗
(0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.142) (0.143) (0.153)
CPIGRO -0.008† -0.009† -0.008† -0.008† -0.008 -0.009†
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
RERGRO -0.336∗ -0.322∗ -0.315∗ -0.326∗ -0.338∗ -0.329∗
(0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.146) (0.155)
WLDGRO -0.677† -0.633 - 0.638 -0.635 -0.643 -0.810∗
(0.391) (0.393) (0.393) (0.390) (0.391) (0.408)
WLDFDIadj 0.373∗∗ 0.404∗∗ 0.412∗∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 0.390∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039)
DISTA -0.155∗∗ -0.112 0.026† -0.156∗∗ -0.189∗
(0.058) (0.095) (0.015) (0.059) (0.093)










N 1541 1541 1541 1541 1541 1331
Log-lhd -1716.811 -1722.399 -1721.352 -1716.134 -1716.007 -1423.608
χ2 3146.643 3185.418 3170.289 3473.614 3141.041 4080.322
Signiﬁcance levels: † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is expressed in natural
logarithms.
way to interpret this result is to conclude that the positive impact of the extended market variable
is mainly driven by PTAs between large and small countries, rather than partners of equal size.
However, this statement must be very heavily qualiﬁed due to the complexities in construction of
the multiplicative version of PTAGDP.
The second alternative speciﬁcation focuses on estimating the threshold eﬀect of signing a PTA.
Section 4.2 has argued that the PTAGDP variable captures two eﬀects: the initial (threshold)
impact of becoming a part of a larger market, and the continued eﬀect of expanding that market
through growth and ascension to new PTAs. In order to establish the relative importance of the
34former, we introduce a dummy variable PTAd that is equal to 1 if a country is a member of one
or more PTAs. We have already mentioned that using this variable in the presence of PTAGDP
leads to multicollinearity problems and causes the dummy coeﬃcient to lose signiﬁcance.60 The
same is true of the distance variable, since it only takes on positive values when a country has
joined at least one PTA.61 This implies that we cannot estimate the threshold and expansion
eﬀects simultaneously, and we will therefore use the PTA dummy variable to capture the former
and estimate the latter separately in one of the subsequent speciﬁcations.
The results of estimating the FDI model with a simple PTA dummy are shown in column (3) of
Table 6, and the estimated coeﬃcients are again close to the original speciﬁcation.62 The dummy
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the two percent level and its magnitude suggests that joining a PTA
increases net FDI inﬂows of an average country by 32 percent.63 This semi-elasticity is not large
when compared with the values of dummy coeﬃcients estimated in gravity models of bilateral
trade, which routinely exceed one.64 It should be acknowledged that, given the discrete nature
of the dummy and its simple distribution, it is diﬃcult to conclude what exactly this variable
is capturing. For example, the estimated coeﬃcient could be picking up the average of a range
of PTA-related eﬀects, or potentially even other shocks that are contemporaneous with joining a
preferential agreement (this identiﬁcation issue is common to all estimates relying on one or more
dummy variables). Therefore, while the results in column (3) suggest the presence of large and
signiﬁcant threshold eﬀects, the point value of their estimated semi-elasticity should be interpreted
with caution.
A related sensitivity test is an investigation of whether the number of PTAs in which a given
country participates has a discernible eﬀect on net FDI. Column (4) of Table 6 shows the estimated
coeﬃcients from a model where a PTA dummy has been replaced with a variable equal to the
number of PTAs a country has joined (PTAnum). This variable ranges from zero for countries
that do no participate in any PTAs to 37, which is the number of PTAs signed by the European
Union by the end of 2004. As before, the coeﬃcients on the model’s control variables are reasonably
close to the baseline model and PTAnum is positive and signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
The coeﬃcient magnitude implies that signing each additional PTA tends to increase net FDI by
three and a half percent. However, the coeﬃcient on the distance variable is of the wrong sign
and signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. This result does not support the validity of the current
speciﬁcation and is not easily explainable, although we can propose three potential justiﬁcations.
The ﬁrst argument is that by construction, the PTAnum variable imposes a restriction that the
marginal FDI eﬀects of each additional PTA are exactly the same. Clearly, the heterogeneity of
PTAs in our sample speaks against such a restriction. For example, we would expect a much larger
change in Algerian net FDI from the Algeria-EU preferential agreement than from the Algeria-
Egypt preferential agreement—yet in terms of PTAnum, both would be represented by the same
incremental change in the independent variable. Furthermore, at any given level of this variable
its eﬀects are not homogeneous across countries. Suppose that the EU is the main source of FDI,
60Recall the discussion in section 4.2, which argued that including both variables in a single regression equation
will lead to a violation of the full rank assumption.
61Estimating a model with all three variables included causes the dummy and the distance variable to lose signiﬁ-
cance.
62As before, the p-value of global growth is right around 0.10.
63Because the dummy implies a discrete change in the value of the dependent variable, its coeﬃcient cannot be
interpreted as an elasticity unless it is very small. However, it is always the case that
∆y
y = e
β − 1, where β is the
dummy coeﬃcient.
64See, for example, Adams et al. (2003), Soloaga and Winters (2001), Rose and van Wincoop (2001), and others.
35and signing a PTA with the EU results in the largest change in net FDI for any given country.
If countries sign PTAs with the EU at diﬀerent times (i.e. the EU agreement may be the ﬁrst
PTA for one country, the third for another, and the tenth agreement for a third), the mapping
of changes in PTAnum to the variation in the dependent variable is not straight-forward. These
issues may oﬀer one explanation for the unexpected coeﬃcient on distance—since the PTAnum
variable imposes both a within- and across-country homogeneity on the set of PTAs signed by a
given country (neither of which are appropriate assumptions), it does not properly capture the
underlying relationship between preferential liberalization and FDI and also interferes with the
ability of the distance variable to account for the proximity aspect of this relationship. In other
words, the size of a country’s PTA partners matters, and therefore PTAGDP is a better way of
capturing the PTA-FDI relationship.
The second potential explanation is related to the ﬁrst, but also based on our discussion of
speciﬁcation (3). Earlier, we have argued that the distance variable may not be an appropriate
control when we attempt to capture the eﬀects of preferential liberalization on FDI by means
of a dummy variable. Since PTAnum is more similar in its distribution to a dummy than a
semi-continuous variable like PTAGDP, it is possible that including the distance variable is not
appropriate in this speciﬁcation and, given the problematic nature of PTAnum, produces perverse
results. In any case, since the PTAnum variable is positive and signiﬁcant, we know the results
are driven by countries with a large number of agreements. These are led by the new EU accession
countries, which have received growing inﬂows of FDI for a number of years prior to joining the
EU while also having signed a plethora of bilateral accords as a precondition of EU membership.
Because the distance variable is increasing in the number of PTAs for a given country and given the
positive coeﬃcient on the PTAnum variable, it may not be that surprising that we ﬁnd a positive
link between more FDI and distance.
Third, imagine a situation where country i signs N PTAs with countries [1,N], while a country
j signs a single PTA with the same N countries. A positive coeﬃcient on the PTAnum variable
implies that the eﬀects of the former are much larger than the latter, even though both countries i
and j have access to the exact same PTA market size. Therefore, it is our belief that this variable
does not present a full and accurate description of the PTA-FDI relationship. We therefore revert
to the original comment on the results of this speciﬁcation—the estimated coeﬃcients on distance
and PTAnum are not intuitive and should be interpreted with caution.65
The next extension to the baseline model investigates the potential signiﬁcance of the expec-
tation of joining a PTA. Here, we return to the expected PTA dummy of the replication model,
deﬁning PTAEXP as equal to one for two years prior to a PTA coming into force, and zero before
and after those dates. The estimation results are shown in column (5) of Table 6. Contrary to
the ﬁndings of Lederman et al. (2005) and consistent with our replication estimates in Table 3, we
cannot identify any signiﬁcant eﬀects of the expectation of joining a PTA, although the rest of the
estimated coeﬃcients are extremely similar to model (1).66 We have also attempted alternative
speciﬁcations of this variable, extending its duration to three years prior to the PTA’s entry into
force as well as limiting it to one year. In either case, the results are virtually identical to those
shown in column (5), with the expected PTA dummy never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
65We have also attempted to estimate the same model with quadratic and cubic PTAnum terms to check whether
there is a certain number of PTAs that tends to result in maximum gains in net FDI. The coeﬃcient estimates on
the control variables are virtually identical to those in speciﬁcation (4), while the additional PTAnum terms are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Therefore, it appears that in our model net FDI inﬂows are strictly increasing in the
number of preferential agreements—although this statement is subject to the same qualiﬁers as the criticisms above.
66The inﬂation and world growth variables have p-values of 0.10.
36There are several reasons why we may be unsuccessful in identifying an anticipation eﬀect of
a new preferential agreement, most of them similar to the problems with PTAd and PTAnum.
First, since many countries have more than one PTA and we do not rank PTAs in terms of their
potential eﬀect on FDI, it may be the case that the expectation of some agreements raises FDI
but the expectation of others does not. Since the expected PTA variable is only deﬁned for the
ﬁrst agreement signed by a given country, identifying a robust anticipation eﬀect is likely to be
diﬃcult. In other words, the PTAEXP variable is constructed in such a way that the eﬀect of
the expectation of joining a PTA can only be captured in the sub-sample of ﬁrst agreements for
each country. Therefore, it may be the case that the expectation eﬀect exists but we are not able
to identify it due to the implicit selection bias. In addition, there are some methodological issues
with including this variable in the model. The PTAEXP variable will be statistically signiﬁcant
if, controlling for all other factors, FDI is higher in the two years prior to a ﬁrst PTA’s signing than
either before or after that period.67 However, to the extent that the PTA-FDI relationship is driven
by the FDI’s response to the investment or investment climate provisions of a PTA, no expectation
eﬀect is possible until the PTA comes into force and the existing barriers are actually dismantled.
Similarly, if FDI is a complement to trade and trade ﬂows do not change until the tariﬀs are actually
lowered, the expectation eﬀect may also be lessened.68 Therefore, the PTA anticipation eﬀect is
likely to work through only a subset of channels that link preferential liberalization to FDI and its
empirical contribution to the PTA-FDI relationship is more diﬃcult to capture.
The last sensitivity test comes back to the question originally posed during the discussion of
speciﬁcation (3): does the PTAGDP variable capture the threshold eﬀect of signing a PTA, the
expansion eﬀect of belonging to a growing common market, or a combination of the two? In
estimating speciﬁcation (3), we found that the threshold eﬀect is large and signiﬁcant. Therefore,
an appropriate question is whether the PTAGDP variable helps to account for any additional
variation in the dependent variable once the threshold eﬀect has been captured. As mentioned
earlier, it is not possible to include both the extended common market variable and a PTA dummy
in a single equation due to collinearity problems. However, it is possible to address this question by
limiting our sample to countries that participate in one or more PTAs and estimating equation (2)
for this reduced sample. Since all countries in this reduced sample belong to a PTA, there should
be no threshold eﬀect and the PTAGDP coeﬃcient should only be signiﬁcant if joining a larger
market results in increased FDI—i.e. the expansion eﬀect.
The results of estimating the above model are shown in column (6) of Table 6. The coeﬃcient
magnitudes are somewhat diﬀerent from the reference speciﬁcation, but all variables are statistically
signiﬁcant and correctly signed. Most importantly, the coeﬃcient on the extended common market
variable remains signiﬁcant at the one percent level. As expected, the implied elasticity value is
lower than in the reference speciﬁcation, although the reduction is not large (from 0.60 to 0.52).
This result is a bit puzzling, since, given the large estimate of the threshold eﬀect in speciﬁcation
(3), we would expect a larger decrease in the value of the coeﬃcient. One potential explanation
could be that the speciﬁcation (6) only sterilizes the threshold eﬀect of signing the ﬁrst PTA for a
given country. If a country is a member of two or more PTAs, their threshold eﬀects continue to be
indistinguishable from the impact of larger market size of PTA partners (expansion eﬀect). Given
this qualiﬁcation, it is likely that the current speciﬁcation only partially picks up the expansion
67Note that “controlling for other factors” here also includes the extended common market variable following the
agreement’s entry into force.
68It is unlikely to be eliminated entirely, since there may be some new FDI in advance of liberalization to create
capacity for future production (e.g. building of factories).
37eﬀect. However, together with the results of speciﬁcations (1) and (3), the model in column
(6) supports a hypothesis that joining a PTA and being a part of a larger common market are
both important channels linking preferential liberalization and net FDI inﬂows—but market size is
probably more important.
4.4 Decomposition by income level and time period
In this section, we attempt various decompositions of our sample by geographic region, income level,
and time period to determine whether our aggregate results mask some important sub-trends. In
addition, the estimates of this section will serve as extra sensitivity tests to assess the robustness of
the aggregate relationship between preferential liberalization and FDI in the smaller sub-samples.
We begin with some decompositions by income level, with the results shown in Table 7. Column
(1) of this table repeats the reference estimates for the full sample (the same as column (1) in Table
6) for ease of comparison with alternative speciﬁcations.
Table 7: Estimation results by income level: net FDI inﬂows
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coeﬃcient
GDP 0.899∗∗ 0.850∗∗ 0.988∗∗
(0.017) (0.021) (0.052)
OPEN 0.941∗∗ 0.946∗∗ 2.596∗∗
(0.083) (0.085) (0.971)
GDPGRO 0.256† 0.311∗ 0.231
(0.142) (0.148) (0.995)
CPIGRO -0.008† -0.008 0.460
(0.005) (0.005) (0.849)
RERGRO -0.336∗ -0.331∗ -1.045
(0.146) (0.149) (1.448)
WLDGRO -0.677† -0.898∗ 0.589
(0.391) (0.418) (1.832)
WLDFDIadj 0.373∗∗ 0.400∗∗ 0.443∗∗
(0.039) (0.042) (0.096)
PTAGDP 0.060∗∗ 0.080∗∗ -0.082
(0.018) (0.019) (0.068)
DISTA -0.155∗∗ -0.233∗∗ 0.331
(0.058) (0.064) (0.204)
N 1541 1320 206
Log-lhd -1716.811 -1467.937 -250.77
χ2 3146.643 2178.762 412.184
Signiﬁcance levels: † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The depen-
dent variable is expressed in natural logarithms. Col-
umn (1) shows estimates for all countries, column (2)
limits the sample to low and middle income countries,
and column (3) shows only high income countries.
38The ﬁrst experiment involves limiting our focus to low and middle income countries,69 which
results in the reduction of sample size to 1320 observations, representing an unbalanced panel of
76 countries between 1980 and 2004. The FGLS estimates are shown in column (2) of Table 7.
Both the coeﬃcient values and their signiﬁcance levels are not too diﬀerent from the reference
speciﬁcation,70 and a Wald test (p = 0.00) indicates that the model coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant as a
group. The coeﬃcients on the extended common market and average distance to PTA partners are
somewhat larger than in the reference model, and signiﬁcant at the one percent level. In contrast,
we get vastly diﬀerent results when we estimate equation (2) for the sample of high income countries
only. These estimated coeﬃcients are shown in column (3), and their values diﬀer dramatically
from both the full sample and the developing countries model. Only the GDP, openness, and world
FDI variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating that neither the size of the extended
common market nor the average distance from PTA partners are important determinants of net
FDI inﬂows for the high income countries in our sample. Therefore, our results suggest that the
estimated link between preferential liberalization and net FDI inﬂows is primarily driven by North-
South and/or South-South FDI.71 Since most of the variance in the value of PTAGDP is accounted
for by PTAs with high income partners (by deﬁnition most Southern countries do not have large
GDP) and since the positive eﬀect of PTAGDP is driven mainly by PTAs between small and
large partners, North-South PTAs are probably more important than South-South agreements in
generating additional net FDI inﬂows. One important qualiﬁcation to this ﬁnding is the fact that
the ﬁfteen member European Union is treated as a single country in our sample, which limits the
cross-sectional dimension of the panel to ten members. Most importantly, this approach prevents
us from capturing the FDI stimulus experienced by late entrants to the EU such as Ireland, Greece,
Portugal, and Spain.72 Since North-North PTAs in our sample are few (they are EFTA, the EEA,
and USA-Canada as a part of NAFTA) and South-North FDI is relatively small, it is perhaps
not surprising that we cannot identify a robust relationship between, on the one hand, PTAGDP
and DISTA and, on the other hand, net FDI inﬂows for high income countries. In addition, the
relatively small size of the high income sample may not provide enough data points to accurately
capture the relationship even if it exists, especially considering the fact that we have to use up
additional degrees of freedom to estimate the autocorrelation coeﬃcient and the parameters of the
variance-covariance matrix.73
Next, we turn to decomposing the full country sample into separate time periods. Medvedev
(2006) showed that the mid-1990s witnessed an explosive growth in the number of PTAs, which
increased by 130 percent from 1995 to 2004. Many of these new agreements were of the “third
wave” kind, putting much more emphasis on “deep integration” provisions than the earlier PTAs.
Therefore, we would like to test whether the PTA-FDI link that we have established in the course
of earlier analysis is larger or more signiﬁcant in the sample limited to the later PTAs. The results
of these experiments are summarized in Table 8, where column (1) again repeats the reference
69We deﬁne high income countries as twenty four members of the OECD plus Liechtenstein.
70Inﬂation becomes insigniﬁcant at the ten percent level only because the p-value changes 0.099 to 0.10.
71We have also estimated the model in equation (2) separately for developing countries in Latin America, East
and South Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Africa. The estimates are shown in Appendix B. Since the
relevant sample sizes are quite small, the results are not very robust and most coeﬃcient estimates are insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. For these reasons, any conclusions drawn from the estimates in Table 15 are tentative and must
be interpreted with a large degree of caution.
72See section 3 for references to the literature that has studied the FDI consequences of the early rounds of EU
accession.
73In the case of small sample sizes, it is quite important that we impose a common autocorrelation parameter,
since this results in substantial savings in degrees of freedom used and therefore increased eﬃciency.
39speciﬁcation estimates (i.e. the full sample of 87 countries over the 1980–2004 time period) for ease
of comparison.
Table 8: Estimation results by time period: net FDI inﬂows
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coeﬃcient
GDP 0.899∗∗ 0.890∗∗ 0.890∗∗
(0.017) (0.023) (0.019)
OPEN 0.941∗∗ 0.980∗∗ 0.914∗∗
(0.083) (0.123) (0.100)
GDPGRO 0.256† 0.178 0.196
(0.142) (0.160) (0.195)
CPIGRO -0.008† -0.002 -0.066
(0.005) (0.005) (0.041)
RERGRO -0.336∗ -0.453∗ -0.249
(0.146) (0.191) (0.200)
WLDGRO -0.677† -0.532 -1.034∗
(0.391) (0.520) (0.487)
WLDFDIadj 0.373∗∗ 0.400∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.039) (0.071) (0.059)
PTAGDP 0.060∗∗ 0.018 0.093∗∗
(0.018) (0.023) (0.019)
DISTA -0.155∗∗ -0.024 -0.230∗∗
(0.058) (0.075) (0.068)
N 1541 759 778
Log-lhd -1716.811 -878.668 -723.054
χ2 3146.643 1644.254 2295.724
Signiﬁcance levels: † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The depen-
dent variable is expressed in natural logarithms. Col-
umn (1) shows estimates for all time periods, column (2)
limits the sample to 1980–1994, and column (3) shows
the estimates for 1994–2004.
Column (2) of Table 8 shows the estimated coeﬃcients of the model described by equation (2)
when the sample period is limited to 1980 through 1994. The latter year was chosen to split the
sample for two reasons: ﬁrst, as mentioned earlier, the early 1990s mark a structural shift in the
growth of the number of PTAs (see Figure 1 in Medvedev (2006)), and second, this year results
in an approximately even division of the sample in two halves (759 observations in this period vs.
778 observations in the 1995–2004 time period). The lack of data for some countries in this earlier
period limits the cross-sectional dimension of our panel to 74 groups. The estimated coeﬃcients are
broadly similar to speciﬁcation (1), and the Wald test (p = 0.00) indicates that they are signiﬁcant
as a group at the 1 percent level. However, GDP growth, inﬂation, and global growth do not appear
to be important determinants of net FDI inﬂows in the 1980–1994 time period. Most importantly,
neither the PTAGDP nor the DISTA variable are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level (the relevant
p-values are 0.424 and 0.746, respectively). Therefore, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship
40between preferential liberalization and net FDI inﬂows during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Focusing instead on the later part of the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium
changes the PTA-related results dramatically. Due to improved data coverage, the cross-sectional
dimension of our panel increases to 85 countries (this is the full sample less Netherlands Antilles
and Equatorial Guinea). The estimated coeﬃcients for this sample are shown in column (3) of
Table 8. The model coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant as a group (Wald p = 0.00), but, in addition to GDP
growth and inﬂation, the REER variable is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (the p-values are
0.315, 0.108, and 0.214, respectively). On the other hand, both of the PTA variables are signiﬁcant
at the one percent level and have the expected signs. The estimated elasticities of PTAGDP and
DISTA are somewhat larger than the results in the reference speciﬁcation. Thus, Table 8 suggests
that the estimated link between preferential liberalization and net FDI is mainly driven by the
eﬀects of PTAs that have come into force during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
There are several reasons why we may expect this result. First, as mentioned earlier, PTAs
signed over the course of the last decade have generally focused on “deep integration” provisions
much more heavily than the earlier agreements. In addition, the “third wave’ of PTAs featured many
agreements that were signed between countries that are not each other’s major trading partners,
therefore making other aspects of integration relatively more important. A particularly important
link between the new PTAs and FDI is the vast expansion in trade in services, to which FDI is
a natural complement. As an example, consider the recent US-Singapore FTA, which is unlikely
to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on merchandise trade ﬂows between the two partners (especially taking
into account Singapore’s very liberal MFN tariﬀ schedule) but is expected to have a much larger
impact on the already substantial trade in services between the two economies. Finally, studies
such as World Bank (2002) have documented the tremendous expansion in the role of FDI as a
source ﬁnancing (especially in developing countries) during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and at
least part of this expansion is potentially linked to the increased global integration brought about
by the “third wave” PTAs.
Despite these arguments, there also several reasons to be cautious when interpreting the above
results. First, causality is much more diﬃcult to establish than correlation. Therefore, even though
both the number and scope of PTAs were increasing dramatically at the same time as average
country net FDI inﬂows were surging, it is impossible to know for certain that the latter were
directly caused by the former. It may even be the case that, as FDI increased globally in the late
1990s, many countries actively pursued PTAs as a strategy to attract additional net FDI inﬂows.
At the same time, the hope of attracting additional FDI is only one of the many reasons to join
PTAs and, since only one-quarter of all PTAs signed during the 1995-2004 period were North-
South, it was probably not the main driver of the growth in the number of PTAs during that time.
Second, the results of Table 8 do not necessarily imply that the “deep integration” provisions of
later PTAs are responsible for the empirical PTA-FDI link, since the “deep integration” provisions
are not the only feature diﬀerentiating the later PTAs and some of the earlier ones also contained
chapters dealing with the liberalization of investment ﬂows (e.g. EFTA, MERCOSUR, US-Israel
FTA). Finally, there are also some qualiﬁcations on econometric grounds. It is diﬃcult to compare
results across various samples because they generate diﬀerent estimates of the AR(1) parameters
and the structure of the variance-covariance matrix. In some cases, the very small sample sizes
preclude all but the most general of inferences, since the properties of the FGLS estimators are
only known asymptotically. Therefore, only broad-based conclusions are likely to be valid based on
the results found in this section, since direct comparisons of individual coeﬃcients from diﬀerent
models are generally inappropriate.
415 Conclusion
A large and growing body of literature has been devoted to understanding the trade creation and
diversion eﬀects of preferential trade agreements. On the other hand, the investment consequences
of preferential liberalization have received relatively little theoretical and empirical attention. This
paper adds to the small but growing literature on the links between PTAs and FDI by establishing
a robust positive relationship between preferential trade liberalization and net FDI inﬂows for a
large panel of countries and preferential agreements. There are four main messages emerging from
our work. First, our results show that the FDI beneﬁts of preferential liberalization are increasing
with the size of PTA partners and their proximity to the host country. Second, we establish both
a threshold (membership) and a market size component to the PTA-FDI relationship, although
the latter seems more important. Third, we ﬁnd that this relationship is mainly driven by the
developing countries in our sample, which implies that the eﬀect is due mostly to North-South
PTAs. Finally, we show that the link between preferential liberalization and FDI is strongest in the
late 1990s and early 2000s—a period when most “deep integration” agreements have been signed.
We identify ﬁve major channels through which preferential liberalization may aﬀect FDI. The
direct eﬀect, observable in many but not all preferential agreements, is the inﬂuence of investment
liberalization provisions on both incoming and outgoing FDI. The indirect eﬀects include overall
strengthening of the investment climate, access to larger markets, and the response of investment to
changes in trade ﬂows. In particular, “deep integration” provisions other than investment clauses,
such as service sector liberalization and mechanisms for dispute settlement, are likely to result
in greater FDI. Similarly, closer integration of PTA partners following preferential liberalization
creates a larger common market which may bring in additional FDI due to economies of scale. On
the other hand, the relationship between changes in trade ﬂows and FDI is much more complicated.
While some models point to a negative association (e.g. tariﬀ-jumping FDI), others maintain it to
be positive, and yet other models link the sign of the eﬀect to the type of production structure of
the MNE undertaking the investment. Finally, to the extent that preferential liberalization may
stimulate additional growth which requires and attracts more investment, one may also expect to
see a dynamic relationship between PTAs and FDI. However, the direction of causation is not clear,
and PTAs are unlikely to be a major determinant of economic growth.
Since the theory behind the interactions between preferential liberalization and investment does
not clearly determine the magnitude or sign of the relationship, we examine the eﬀects of PTAs on
net FDI inﬂows in a panel of 87 countries over the 1980–2004 period. Our pooled estimates take
explicit account of both the time-series and cross-sectional correlations in the data, and rely on a
comprehensive database of PTAs, which includes both WTO-notiﬁed and unnotiﬁed agreements.
We ﬁnd evidence that entering into PTAs with more and/or larger partners has a positive eﬀect on
an average country’s net FDI inﬂows, while being located further away from these PTA partners
tends to dampen the FDI stimulus eﬀect. The former is captured by an extended market size
variable, which is the sum of GDP of all PTA partners of a given country. The estimated elasticity
of this eﬀect in the baseline model is 0.06, which implies that a country like Costa Rica can expect
its net FDI inﬂows to rise by 11.5 percent after signing a preferential agreement with a high income
partner like the United States. On the other hand, signing a PTA with Ecuador, whose GDP
is only 60 percent larger than Costa Rica’s, results in almost no change in the latter’s FDI. The
proximity eﬀect is captured by average distance to all of the country’s PTA partners and carries
an estimated elasticity of -0.16. This implies, for example, that Costa Rica’s FDI increase would
be reduced to 9.6 percent if the USA were as far away from it as Germany.
42Due to the limitations of our dataset, it is diﬃcult to establish the relative contributions of
each of the above theoretical channels to net FDI inﬂows. We are able to test for both a threshold
eﬀect (i.e. the act of signing a PTA) and a market expansion eﬀect (i.e. the increase in the size of
the extended market following the PTA’s entry into force), both of which turn out to be important
determinants of FDI but the latter is statistically stronger. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the importance
of scale economies in attracting net FDI inﬂows. The large size of the threshold eﬀect indicates
that our results are to a large extent determined by PTAs with big and/or multiple partners. On
the other hand, contrary to some of the earlier studies, we cannot ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
expectation of joining a PTA. This result oﬀers some support for the importance of PTA investment
provisions, since the barriers to entry are not dismantled until after the agreement is implemented.
Decomposing the results by income level reveals that a positive and signiﬁcant PTA-FDI rela-
tionship is only found among low and middle income countries, and therefore the aggregate results
appear driven mainly by North-South agreements. We reach this conclusion by combining the
former ﬁnding with the greater relative importance of market size (vis-´ a-vis the threshold eﬀect)
and the fact that the PTA-FDI link appears to be determined by agreements between large and
small partners. We also show that while the empirical link between preferential trade liberalization
and net FDI inﬂows is insigniﬁcant during the 1980s and early 1990s, the relationship is highly
signiﬁcant during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The latter is also the period when the number
of PTAs has grown dramatically and many of the new agreements began featuring various “deep
integration” provisions. Therefore, we ﬁnd evidence of correlation between the growing number of
“deep integration” agreements and increases in net FDI inﬂows. Overall, our results oﬀer at least
partial support for the investment provisions, investment climate, and market size hypotheses of
the relationship between preferential trade liberalization and FDI. However, these decomposition
results must be treated with a large degree of caution, since small sample sizes adversely aﬀect the
reliability of test statistics and limit the variation in dependent and independent variables, therefore
preventing eﬃcient estimation. Finally, combining the estimates of this paper with the results of
Medvedev (2006), we have some evidence that, following preferential trade liberalization, FDI and
trade may be complements. This is because Medvedev (2006), using a similar sample of PTAs,
found a positive eﬀect of preferential liberalization on trade between PTA member countries. Since
the same set of PTAs results in greater trade and more net FDI inﬂows, the relationship between
trade and FDI is likely to be positive. However, this statement must be taken with a large degree
of caution because our results do not provide any information on the source of FDI, which could
come from countries that have experienced trade diversion.
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that PTAs (and “deep integration” PTAs in par-
ticular) are associated with signiﬁcant increases in the net FDI inﬂows of their participants. Our
estimates of the FDI elasticity of a PTA extended common market are roughly similar to Leder-
man et al. (2005) and Levy Yeyati et al. (2003), who obtain an elasticity of approximately 0.1. We
also identify signiﬁcant proximity eﬀects, although our estimates of the FDI-distance elasticity are
much lower than those obtained under bilateral gravity speciﬁcations of Levy Yeyati et al. (2003)
and Adams et al. (2003). Our estimates are particularly interesting since we consider a very wide
sample of PTAs, many of which are small and/or poorly implemented. At the same time, there are
a number of questions that our work does not address. For example, we do not consider the source
of net FDI inﬂows and therefore cannot identify any PTA-induced investment creation or diversion
eﬀects. We also do not distinguish between types of PTAs—North-South vs. South-South, bilateral
vs. regional, etc.—although diﬀerent kinds of agreements are likely to have varying investment ef-
fects. Finally, we do not diﬀerentiate between PTAs that include explicit investment provisions and
43those that do not. Answers to these questions are likely to shed additional light on the empirical
relationship between preferential trade liberalization and FDI and therefore represent promising
directions for future research on the subject.
44A Data details
A.1 List of sample countries
Table 9: Regional deﬁnitions and country membership
Latin America, Caribbean East Asia, Paciﬁc Europe, Central Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
Argentina China Armenia Burundi
Bahamas, The Fiji Bulgaria Cameroon
Belize Hong Kong, China Croatia Central African Republic
Bolivia Indonesia Cyprus Congo, Dem. Rep.
Brazil Malaysia Czech Republic Cote d’Ivoire
Chile Papua New Guinea Georgia Equatorial Guinea
Colombia Philippines Hungary Gabon
Costa Rica Samoa Macedonia, FYR Gambia, The
Dominica Singapore Moldova Ghana
Dominican Republic Solomon Islands Poland Lesotho
Ecuador Thailand Romania Malawi
Grenada Tonga Russian Federation Nigeria
Guyana Slovak Republic Sierra Leone
Mexico Turkey South Africa




St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia





South Asia Middle East North Africa High income
India Iran, Islamic Rep. Algeria Australia
Pakistan Israel Egypt, Arab Rep. Canada









With the exception of the PTA database, all variables used in the analysis can be easily obtained
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database and from Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII ). The WDI database was accessed by the
author through an internal World Bank server, but the data are also available on CD-ROM at
subscribing libraries. In addition, the CD-ROM can be purchased from the World Bank bookstore,
either in person or on-line. The CEPII distance data (dist_cepii.xls) may be freely downloaded
45online at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. The details on PTA names
and membership are provided in Appendix E of Medvedev (2006). Table 10 lists the names and
codes of the WDI and CEPII data series that were used in the analysis.
Table 10: Variable names and codes
Variable Name in source data Code
GDP GDP (current US$) NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
Exports Merchandise exports (current US$) TX.VAL.MRCH.CD.WT
Imports Merchandise imports (current US$) TM.VAL.MRCH.CD.WT
CPI Consumer price index (2000 = 100) FP.CPI.TOTL
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inﬂows (BoP, current US$) BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD
REER Real eﬀective exchange rate index (2000 = 100) PX.REX.REER
Distance dist
A.3 Data transformation






* Create a distance variable
local EUN "AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP SWE GBR"
use V:\Trade\dist_cepii, clear
foreach i of local EUN {
replace partner1 = "EUN" if partner1 == "‘i’"
replace partner2 = "EUN" if partner2 == "‘i’"
}
drop if partner1==partner2
collapse (mean) dist, by(partner1 partner2)
replace partner1 = "ADO" if partner1 == "AND"
replace partner2 = "ADO" if partner2 == "AND"
sort partner1 partner2
save temp, replace
* Transform PTA membership data
insheet using R:\Denis\RTA\RTA2.csv, clear
drop if partner1==partner2
* Remove duplicate country pairs
sort partner1 partner2 start agreement
by partner1 partner2: gen dup=cond(_N==1,0,_n)
drop if dup>1
drop dup type notified num
drop if agreement=="GSTP" | agreement == "PTN"
sort partner1 partner2
merge partner1 partner2 using temp
drop if _merge==2
drop _merge
gen year = .
sort partner1
save temp, replace
* Add a time-series dimension
46replace year = 1979 if year == .
forval i=1980(1)2004 {
append using temp




* Create a master file with all other series
insheet using FDI.csv, clear
gen trd = exp+imp
gen open = trd/gdp
gen gnipc = gni/pop
local eu "AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT ESP SWE GBR"
gen str3 c1 = country
foreach i of local eu {
replace c1 = "EUN" if c1 == "‘i’"
}
egen eu_fdi = sum(fdi) if c1 == "EUN", by(year)
egen eu_gdp = sum(gdp) if c1 == "EUN", by(year)
egen eu_gni = sum(gni) if c1 == "EUN", by(year)
egen eu_pop = sum(pop) if c1 == "EUN", by(year)
egen eu_open = sum(trd/eu_gdp) if c1 == "EUN", by(year)
egen eu_cpi = sum(cpi*(gdp/eu_gdp)) if c1 == "EUN", by(year)
egen eu_rer = sum(rer*(gdp/eu_gdp)) if c1 == "EUN", by(year)
gen eu_gnipc = eu_gni/eu_pop
replace gfdi =gfdi/100*gdp
foreach i in fdi gdp gnipc open cpi rer {




collapse (mean) fdi gdp pop gnipc open cpi rer (sum) gfdi, by(country year)
sort country year
save fdi, replace








keep partner1 partner2 year agreement start dist gdp
* Generate two versions (additive, multiplicative) of PTAGDP
egen ptagdp = sum(gdp) if year>=start, by(partner1 year)
egen ptagdp2 = sum(ln(gdp)) if year>=start, by(partner1 year)
* Generate a 1 percent increase in GDP
gen gdp01 = gdp*1.01
egen ptagdp01 = sum(gdp01) if year>=start, by(partner1 year)
egen ptagdp201 = sum(ln(gdp01)) if year>=start, by(partner1 year)
* Generate an expected PTA variable
gen expPTA=1 if (start-year)==2 | (start-year)==1
* Generate a simple PTA dummy
gen PTAd = 1
47replace PTAd = 0 if year<start
* Generate a variable containing the number of PTAs
egen tag = tag(partner1 agreement) if year>=start
sort partner1 year
by partner1: gen num = sum(tag)
egen ptanum = max(num), by(partner1 year)
drop tag num
* Generate average and GDP-weighted distance to PTA partners, and distance-weighted PTAGDP
egen adist = mean(dist), by(partner1 year)
egen wdist = sum((1/ptagdp)*gdp*dist), by(partner1 year)
egen wpgdp = sum((adist/dist)*gdp), by(partner1 year)
* Collapse the dataset to a country-year panel and merge with the master file
rename partner1 country
collapse (mean) ptagdp ptagdp2 ptagdp01 ptagdp201 adist wdist wpgdp (max) expPTA PTAd ptanum, by(country year)
sort country year




* Add regional dimension





merge country using temp
drop if _merge == 2
*the above drops individual EU countries
drop if country=="DFA"
drop _merge
* Add more REER data points from DECPG (ARG, BRA, MEX, IND)
sort country year
save fdi, replace




merge country year using temp
drop if _merge==2
drop _merge
replace rer=reer if rer==. & reer~=.
drop reer
* Create world variables
gen temp = fdi if country == "WLD"
egen fdiwld = max(temp), by(year)
replace temp = gfdi if country == "WLD"
egen gfdiwld = max(temp), by(year)
replace temp = gdp if country == "WLD"
egen gdpwld = max(temp), by(year)
drop temp
drop if country == "WLD"
* Calculate growth rates
sort country year
gen GDPgr = (gdp - gdp[_n-1])/gdp[_n-1]
gen CPIgr = (cpi - cpi[_n-1])/cpi[_n-1]
gen GRwld = (gdpwld - gdpwld[_n-1])/gdpwld[_n-1]
gen GRrer = (rer - rer[_n-1])/rer[_n-1]
48* Transform into logs
gen lfdi = ln(fdi)
gen GDP = ln(gdp)
gen GNIpc = ln(gnipc)
gen FDIwld = ln(fdiwld)
gen PTAGDP = ln(ptagdp)
gen PTAGDP01= ln(ptagdp01)
gen CPI = ln(cpi)
rename open OPEN
replace adist = ln(adist)
replace wdist = ln(wdist)
replace wpgdp = ln(wpgdp)
replace gfdi = ln(gfdi)
replace gfdiwld = ln(gfdiwld)
foreach i in PTAGDP ptagdp2 PTAGDP01 ptagdp201 PTAd ptanum adist wdist wpgdp expPTA {
replace ‘i’ = 0 if ‘i’ == .
}
replace adist = 0 if PTAGDP == 0
replace wpgdp = 0 if PTAGDP == 0
* Multiplicative version of PTAGDP
gen test = 1/ptagdp2
replace test = 1 if ptagdp2==0
gen test01 = 1/ptagdp201
replace test01 = 1 if ptagdp201==0
















* Load a small program into memory
* Calculate the implied elasticity of the multiplicative PTAGDP
cap prog drop elas
program define elas
cap drop ly0 ly1 yd
mat lx=get(_b)
mat score ly0=lx if e(sample)
gen ‘1’old = ‘1’
replace ‘1’ = ‘1’01
mat score ly1=lx if e(sample)
replace ‘1’ = ‘1’old
drop ‘1’old
gen yd=((exp(ly1)/exp(ly0))-1)*100






xtreg lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRwld FDIwld PTAGDP, fe
outtex, legend details below
areg lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRwld FDIwld PTAGDP, absorb(code) robust
outtex, legend details below
areg lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld FDIwld PTAGDP, absorb(code) robust
outtex, legend details below
* Breusch-Pagan heteroscedasticity test
reg lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRwld FDIwld PTAGDP dc*
hettest
reg lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld FDIwld PTAGDP dc*
hettest
* Wooldridge autocorrelation test
xtserial lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld FDIwld PTAGDP adist
* Iterated FGLS
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld FDIwld PTAGDP, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
* Iterated FGLS controlling for endogeneity of FDIwld
gen dw = d.FDIwld
reg FDIwld l.FDIwld l.dw if tag==1
outtex, legend details below
predict iFDIwld
reg FDIwld l.FDIwld if tag==1
cap drop lFDIwld
predict lFDIwld
line FDIwld iFDIwld lFDIwld year if tag==1, clwidth(medium medium medium) clcolor(gs0 gs5 gs10)
clpattern(solid dash_dot_dot shortdash_dot) ytitle("Log of world FDI inflows") graphregion(color(white))
legend(label(1 "FDIwld") label(2 "iFDIwld") label(3 "lFDIwld"))
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld iFDIwld PTAGDP, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
* Alternative instrument for world FDI
gen i2FDIwld = fdiwld - fdi if fdi>0
replace i2FDIwld = ln(i2FDIwld)
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld i2FDIwld PTAGDP, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
* Arellano-Bond
xtabond2 lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer FDIwld PTAGDP if e(sample), gmm(l.FDIwld l.dw)
iv(GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr rer PTAGDP) robust twostep
outtex, legend details below
* Time dummies
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer PTAGDP dyear*, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer PTAGDP adist dyear*, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
50* iFGLS with distance
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP wdist, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld wpgdp, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
* FGLS with other checks
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld test adist, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
elas test
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAd adist, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
rename ptanum PTAnum
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAnum adist, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
gen PTAnum2 = PTAnum^2
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAnum PTAnum2 adist, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld expPTA PTAGDP adist, igls panels(heteroskedastic)
i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
* Regressions by region and time period
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist if region~="North",
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist if region=="North",
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist if region=="LAC",
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist if region=="EAP",
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist if region=="EAP"|region=="SAS",
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist if region=="ECA",
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist if region=="MNA"|region=="SSA",
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist if region=="MNA",
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist if year<1995,
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer iFDIwld PTAGDP adist if year>1994,
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
**********************************************************************************
* Using i2FDIwld as an instrument
*
51* iFGLS with distance
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld i2FDIwld PTAGDP adist,
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld i2FDIwld PTAGDP wdist,
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld i2FDIwld wpgdp,
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
* FGLS with other checks
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld i2FDIwld test adist,
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
elas test
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld i2FDIwld PTAd adist,
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
rename ptanum PTAnum
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld i2FDIwld PTAnum adist,
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
gen PTAnum2 = PTAnum^2
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld i2FDIwld PTAnum PTAnum2 adist,
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld i2FDIwld expPTA PTAGDP adist,
igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
* Regressions by region and time period
xtgls lfdi GDP OPEN GDPgr CPIgr GRrer GRwld i2FDIwld PTAGDP adist
if region~="North", igls panels(heteroskedastic) i(code) corr(ar1) t(year) force
outtex, legend details below
**********************************************************************************
* Count countries and PTAs in the sample (for PTAs, keep if e(sample),
* save temp1, merge with temp from RTA.csv)
52B Additional estimation results
B.1 Speciﬁcation tests of the replication model
Table 11 provides a summary of some simple speciﬁcation tests of equation (1). The ﬁrst column
of the table reproduces the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates shown in Table 3 for ease of comparison. Column
(2) applies the Huber-White “sandwich” procedure to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates to obtain robust
standard errors. The robust standard errors of most model coeﬃcients are 15 to 30 larger than the
unadjusted standard errors, although the standard error of openness more than doubles, indicating
that this variable may be the main cause of heteroscedasticity in the model. Despite the marked
increase in the absolute value of standard errors, however, the coeﬃcient signiﬁcance levels (and
therefore inference) remain largely unchanged from the baseline model.
Table 11: Fixed eﬀects and FGLS estimation results: net FDI inﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Coeﬃcient
GDP 1.209∗∗ 1.209∗∗ 0.896∗∗ 1.508∗∗ 0.878∗∗
(0.094) (0.127) (0.016) (0.120) (0.020)
OPEN 0.651∗∗ 0.651∗ 0.879∗∗ 0.601∗∗ 0.875∗∗
(0.118) (0.261) (0.059) (0.161) (0.081)
GNIREL -1.904∗∗ -1.904∗∗ 0.412∗∗ -2.571∗∗ 0.321†
(0.472) (0.495) (0.152) (0.489) (0.173)
GDPGRO 0.444∗ 0.444∗ 0.041 0.448† 0.154
(0.177) (0.185) (0.094) (0.241) (0.126)
CPIGRO -0.028∗∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.011∗
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
WLDGRO -1.235∗∗ -1.235∗∗ -0.596∗ -1.535∗ -0.454
(0.467) (0.455) (0.284) (0.597) (0.371)
WLDFDI 0.376∗∗ 0.376∗∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.336∗∗ 0.455∗∗
(0.037) (0.050) (0.029) (0.046) (0.038)
PTAGDP 0.002 0.002 0.007∗ -0.006 0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
PTAEXP -0.031 -0.031 0.043 -0.010 0.032
(0.061) (0.057) (0.038) (0.078) (0.051)
N 2561 2561 2561 1528 1528
R2(Log-lhd) 0.645 0.645 -3029.078 0.685 -1688.7
F (χ2) 161.21 178.402 6198.195 105.624 3486.39
Signiﬁcance levels : † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is expressed
in natural logarithms. Column (1) shows ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of equation
(1), column (2) shows the same estimates with Huber-White robust stan-
dard errors, column (3) estimates the same equation using three-step FGLS,
column(4) applies ﬁxed eﬀects to the sample of Table 4, column(5) applies
three-step FGLS to the same sample.
Column (3) estimates equation (1) using the three-step FGLS approach (the same one used
for the baseline model in section 4.2). As mentioned in the main text, the heteroscedasticity- and
53autocorrelation-consistent FGLS estimates are not easily comparable to the results produced by the
ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. For example, since the desirable properties of the FGLS estimator can only
be shown to hold asymptotically, hypothesis testing is based on the normal distribution) rather
than its small sample counterparts (i.e. inference is made on the basis of z and χ2 statistics rather
than t and F). Nonetheless, the fact that point estimates of several control variables change by a
large amount and the relative GNI variable changes sign while remaining highly signiﬁcant indicates
that serial correlation is a considerable problem and that ﬁxed eﬀects estimator of equation (1) is
not appropriate in our data.
Column (4) of Table 11 returns to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, but applies it to the limited sample
of countries considered in the baseline model. The sample size is reduced to 1528 observations, which
is smaller than 1541 observations shown in Table 4. The 13 excluded observations correspond to
several data points for Bahamas, Grenada, Kuwait, and Poland where we do not have the data
on GNI per capita. The point estimates diﬀer by as much as 50 percent from those shown in
column (1), but coeﬃcient signs, orders of magnitude, and signiﬁcance levels remain unchanged.74
Therefore, we can conclude that the large reduction in the sample size when moving from equation
(1) to equation (2) does not qualitatively change the model results.
Column (5) applies the three-step FGLS estimator to the sample that was considered in column
(4). The point estimates are very diﬀerent from the previous column, and quite close to those
shown in column (3). As before, when moving from the ﬁxed eﬀects within estimator to FGLS
the relative GNI per capita switches sign while remaining signiﬁcant at the ten percent level, while
GDP growth becomes insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Furthermore, global growth also becomes
insigniﬁcant. Finally, similar to the estimates in column (3), the PTA extended common makret
variable has the expected positive sign and is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Therefore, these
results show that the choice of estimator has a large eﬀect on the point estimates of coeﬃcients,
their signs, and qualitative conclusions drawn from these. On the other hand, reducing the sample
size by 40 percent (moving from the sample of Table 3 to the sample of Table 4) has much more
modest eﬀects on the point estimates and does not aﬀect coeﬃcient signs or model inference.
B.2 Multicollinearity tests
Table 12 conducts some simple tests for multicollinearity between GDP and openness, and GDP
and relative GNI by regressing one of the independent variables against the other. In addition to the
variables shown, each regression also included an intercept term and a set of country ﬁxed eﬀects
(dropping the last one to avoid the dummy variable trap). For each regression, the F statistic is
signiﬁcant at the one percent level, indicating that the model variables are signiﬁcant as a group.
B.3 Granger causality tests
A variable x is said to Granger-cause y if, in a regression of y on its lagged values, lagged values
of x contribute signiﬁcantly to the explanatory power of the model (see Granger, 1969). Table 13
summarizes the results of regressing several of the model variables on their own lags, lags of other
variables, an intercept term, and a set of country ﬁxed eﬀects (the last two are not shown). “L”,
“L2”, and “L3” refer to the ﬁrst, second, and third lags respectively. The lag lengths shown were
chosen as the “best” speciﬁcation after testing several alternative lag structures.
74The point estimate of PTAGDP becomes negative, but in either case it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.










Signiﬁcance levels : † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
The dependent variable is expressed in natu-
ral logarithms.
Table 13: Granger causality estimation results
Variable: FDI OPEN FDI GDP
L.FDI 0.497∗∗ 0.004† 0.435∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.022) (0.002) (0.022) (0.003)
L2.FDI 0.129∗∗ 0.000 0.094∗∗ 0.001
(0.024) (0.002) (0.023) (0.003)
L3.FDI 0.099∗∗ 0.004† 0.052∗∗ 0.007∗













N 2100 2176 2112 2188
R2 0.895 0.959 0.901 0.997
F 107.206 305.264 115.034 4849.023
Signiﬁcance levels: † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able is expressed in natural logarithms.
B.4 Speciﬁcation tests of the baseline model
Table 14 provides a summary of some simple speciﬁcation tests of the baseline model. For ease of
comparison, column (1) repeats the results of estimating equation (2) with three-step FGLS (shown
55Table 14: Fixed eﬀects and FGLS estimation results: net FDI inﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coeﬃcient
GDP 0.899∗∗ 1.208∗∗ 0.899∗∗ 0.899∗∗
(0.017) (0.107) (0.017) (0.017)
OPEN 0.941∗∗ 0.705∗∗ 0.920∗∗ 0.943∗∗
(0.083) (0.162) (0.081) (0.083)
GDPGRO 0.256† 0.452† 0.260† 0.111
(0.142) (0.260) (0.143) (0.127)
CPIGRO -0.008† -0.022∗∗ -0.008† -0.011∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
RERGRO -0.336∗ -0.243 -0.319∗
(0.146) (0.238) (0.147)
WLDGRO -0.677† -1.711∗∗ -0.643 -0.386
(0.391) (0.620) (0.393) (0.371)
WLDFDIadj 0.373∗∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.400∗∗ 0.377∗∗
(0.039) (0.045) (0.038) (0.039)
PTAGDP 0.060∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.018) (0.024) (0.004) (0.018)
DISTA -0.155∗∗ -0.488∗∗ -0.151∗∗
(0.058) (0.079) (0.058)
N 1541 1541 1541 1541
Log-lhd (R2) -1716.811 0.721 -1719.664 -1719.765
χ2(F) 3146.643 110.522 3172.543 3138.254
Signiﬁcance levels: † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable
is expressed in natural logarithms. Column (1) reproduces the esti-
mates of Table 4, column (2) estimates equation (2) using ﬁxed ef-
fects, columns (3) and (4) apply the three-step FGLS estimator while
omitting the distance and REER growth variables, respectively.
in Table 4). For equation (1), section B.1 has shown that the choice of estimator has a signiﬁcant
impact on the model results, while sample size is much less important and does not qualitatively
change the conclusions. In order to test whether is the former is true for equation (2), column (2)
shows the results of estimating this equation with a ﬁxed eﬀects approach. The point estimates
vary widely across speciﬁcations: for example, the coeﬃcients on inﬂation, global growth, and PTA
extended common market are approximately three times larger when using ﬁxed eﬀects. At the
same time, all variables with the exception of REER growth rate have the expected signs and
are signiﬁcant at the ten percent level, and both PTA-related variables are signiﬁcant at the one
percent threshold. This suggests that it is the choice of variables (i.e. model speciﬁcation) rather
than the estimation approach that renders PTAGDP and DISTA statistically signiﬁcant. In other
words, once we account for multicollinearity and endogeneity problems by dropping the GNIREL
variable and replacing WLDFDI with WLDFDIadj, the choice of estimation approach becomes
56less important for drawing broad conclusions from the model.75 The exception to this statement
is the RERGRO variable, which is not statistically signiﬁcant under any approaches that do not
speciﬁcally control for serial correlation.
Columns (3) and (4) investigate the sensitivity of results to the two new variables in equation
(2): average distance to PTA partners and the REER growth rate. Excluding the distance variable
has a very small impact on the coeﬃcient estimates and signiﬁcance levels of the control variables.
Global growth becomes insigniﬁcant at the ten percent level, but in fact the p-value increases from
0.083 to 0.102, which is not a large change. Consistent with intuition, the coeﬃcient on PTAGDP
is much smaller with the distance variable excluded. This is because the former now controls
for both the positive eﬀects of joining a PTA and belonging to a larger common market and the
negative eﬀect of being located farther away from PTA partners.
Excluding the REER growth variable has a much stronger eﬀect on the estimates. While the
coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance levels of the PTA-related variables remain largely unchanged, both
GDP growth and global growth become insigniﬁcant.76 This suggests that REER dynamics play
an important role in determining the distribution of net FDI inﬂows across countries, and ignoring
this channel can lead to unexpected behavior of other model variables.
B.5 Decomposing model results by geographic region and income level
The set of experiments in this section concerns further disaggregating the developing country results
into geographic regions. The ﬁrst region we consider is Latin America and the Caribbean. The
sample consists of 24 countries and 465 observations, and the results are shown in column (1) of
Table 15. Our model does not do well in explaining the variation in the dependent variable, since
only GDP and world FDI are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional conﬁdence levels.
On the other hand, PTAGDP, CPIGRO, and RERGRO barely miss the ten percent signiﬁcance
threshold with p-values of 0.109, 0.113, and 0.131, respectively. These results indicate that our
model may still be applicable to the Latin American data, but that the relatively small size of the
sample does not allow for eﬃcient estimation with FGLS.
Next, we focus on East and South Asia. Here, we consider 14 countries which results in the sam-
ple size of 236 observations. The estimation results are shown in column (2). The only statistically
signiﬁcant variables are GDP, openness, world FDI, and the growth in the real eﬀective exchange
rate. Most importantly, neither of the PTA-related variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at any accepted conﬁdence intervals (the relevant p-values are 0.449 and 0.452 for PTAGDP and
DISTA, respectively). Therefore, preferential liberalization does not appear to be an important
determinant of net FDI for the low and middle income countries in East and South Asia, although
the the sample size disclaimer mentioned while discussing the high income model is also applicable
here. We also estimate a separate model for East Asian countries only, with the results shown in
column (3) of Table 15. This sample contains 12 countries, which limits the number of available
observations to 198. The results are roughly similar to the previous estimates, with three important
diﬀerences. First, the coeﬃcient on openness is much lower when we restrict the sample to East
Asian countries only. One explanation for this could be that while the East Asian economies have
traditionally been more open to trade, the same cannot be said of their South Asian counterparts.
75Recall that OLS, and by extension the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, remains unbiased in the presence of heteroscedas-
ticity and autocorrelation, but is no longer eﬃcient. Therefore, if moving from equation (1) to equation (2) addresses
most of the problems save for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, we expect the diﬀerences between the FGLS
and ﬁxed eﬀects to diminish.
76The p-values increase to 0.382 and 0.297, respectively.
57Table 15: Estimation results by income level and region: net FDI inﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Coeﬃcient
GDP 0.784∗∗ 1.073∗∗ 1.107∗∗ 0.783∗∗ 0.857∗∗ 0.336
(0.024) (0.048) (0.044) (0.052) (0.067) (0.417)
OPEN 0.097 0.999∗∗ 0.816∗∗ 0.541 1.961∗∗ -0.139
(0.112) (0.079) (0.085) (0.345) (0.355) (1.251)
GDPGRO 0.241 0.532 1.081 1.151∗∗ 0.294 -0.640
(0.221) (0.588) (0.664) (0.339) (0.314) (0.930)
CPIGRO -0.009 0.004 0.370 0.020 -0.037 0.118
(0.006) (1.164) (1.198) (0.025) (0.043) (0.200)
RERGRO -0.372 -1.555† -2.794∗∗ -1.243∗∗ 0.083 3.200∗∗
(0.246) (0.883) (1.002) (0.328) (0.245) (1.030)
WLDGRO -0.691 -1.293 -2.640∗ -2.465∗ -1.436 1.713
(0.582) (1.135) (1.307) (1.070) (1.008) (2.062)
WLDFDIadj 0.496∗∗ 0.175† 0.127 0.580∗∗ 0.560∗∗ 0.704∗∗
(0.053) (0.090) (0.091) (0.102) (0.099) (0.220)
PTAGDP 0.053 0.024 0.018 0.105∗∗ 0.015 0.134
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.066) (0.121)
DISTA -0.121 -0.074 -0.072 -0.241† -0.076 -0.446
(0.110) (0.098) (0.096) (0.126) (0.213) (0.405)
N 465 236 198 191 428 123
Log-lhd -403.153 -250.073 -212.783 -183.456 -599.971 -162.488
χ2 1817.553 851.215 948.444 412.818 294.012 37.187
Signiﬁcance levels: † 10% ∗ 5% ∗∗ 1%
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is expressed in
natural logarithms.
Therefore, the variation in the openness variable is smaller in the East Asia sample, where it also
explains a smaller share of the variation in the dependent variable. The second important diﬀerence
is that the coeﬃcient on the REER variable is now signiﬁcant at the one percent level (as opposed
to the eight percent level in speciﬁcation (2)) and much larger in absolute value. This could be
capturing the particular importance of currency ﬂuctuations for FDI in East Asia, such as the sharp
fall in investment in the aftermath of the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis. However, both the PTAGDP
and the adist variables remain insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Therefore, the FDI results for
East Asia largely parallel our conclusions based on the trade gravity model of Medvedev (2006)—
preferential liberalization does not seem to be an important channel for the region’s integration
with the rest of the world. Although it is possible to estimate the model for only South Asian
countries, it is doubtful that the results are robust since there are barely enough observations to
invoke the Central Limit Theorem (there are only two countries in this sample: India and Pakistan,
for a total of 38 observations). Therefore, these estimates are not shown.
The next region we consider is Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. There are 15
countries in this sample (including the recent EU entrants) for a total of 191 observations. The
relatively small number of observations (when compared with other regions) is due to the fact that
little data are available for these countries prior to the 1990s. The estimation results are shown
58in column (4) of Table 15. The outcome is quite unlike the previous models, since all estimated
coeﬃcients with the exception of openness inﬂation are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and are
correctly signed. The elasticities of the extended market variable and the average distance to
PTA partners are somewhat larger than the reference speciﬁcation (column (1) of Table 7), which
shows that joining larger (and closer) markets through conclusion of various PTAs is an important
mechanism of attracting additional FDI in this region.
The ﬁnal set of regions to be examined include Middle Eastern and African countries. This is
the largest group we have considered yet, with 24 countries and 428 observations. The estimated
coeﬃcients are shown in column (5) of Table 15. Only three variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero: GDP, openness, and world FDI. While the coeﬃcient on market size (GDP) is close
to the estimate in the reference speciﬁcation, trade openness is more than double its full sample
estimate, suggesting that this is a particularly important determinant of FDI for these countries.
However, neither the size of the extended common market nor the distance to PTA partners have
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on net FDI inﬂows. We get diﬀerent results when we limit our sample to
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, many of which have signed or are in the process
of negotiating preferential agreements with the EU as a part of the future Euro-Mediterranean
Free Trade Area. These estimates are shown in column (6), and cover 7 countries for a total of
123 observations. Given the very small sample size for this speciﬁcation, we must be particularly
careful with interpretation and inference—therefore the following comments should be taken with
a special degree of caution. Despite the relatively low value of the Wald χ2 statistic, the model
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant as a group at the one percent level. Only two variables are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, and the REER variable is incorrectly signed. The latter could be due to the
fact that most of the sample countries are major oil exporters (including Iran, Kuwait, Tunisia,
and Algeria), which have experienced signiﬁcant REER appreciation through the Dutch disease
channel but have still attracted large quantities of FDI aimed at taking advantage of their natural
resources. Shifting our focus to the PTA-related variables, neither the extended common market
variable nor the average distance to PTA partners are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Therefore,
preferential liberalization does not appear to aﬀect net FDI inﬂows for countries in the Middle East
and North Africa, although these results must be heavily qualiﬁed due to the extremely small size
of the sample.
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